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Abstract
President Biden's "America is back" pledge holds the potential to be put to the test with
the ongoing crisis in Libya. The internationalization of the post-Ghaddafi Libyan breakdown,
strained by great-power competition (GPC) dynamics, poses nonnegligible threats to the United
States (US) national security that extends beyond Libya per se. Reframing the conflict from yet
another Middle East and North Africa (MENA) conflict to an urgent multilateral Mediterranean
security challenge will help elevate the country's profile on the global stage. This thesis outlines
a qualitative, within-case study analysis of the ongoing Libyan crisis from the perspective of US
national security interests. It explores the US role in Libya since 2011 by tracing events applying
the MIDFIELD concept as an analytical taxonomy. In light of causal inference and path
dependency findings, an open normative discussion explores the need for a renovated,
meaningful US reengagement, presenting policy-relevant suggestions. The US should beware of
aiming too high, meaning avoiding unsustainable overreach in Libya, while being knowingly
mindful of the danger of aiming too low, meaning remaining marginally involved in the country
given such absence's national security implications.
Keywords: Libya, US national security, MIDFIELD, MENA, EU, NATO, GPC
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" Look, we're not going to own this post-occupation or post-conflict reconstruction.
We're going to hand it off to the UN, to the Europeans." [Obama, 2011]

"I do not see a role in Libya. I think the United States has right now enough roles.
We're in a role everywhere. So I do not see that." [Trump, 2017]

"America is back. America is back." [Biden, 2021]

ix

Overview of the Project
President Biden's "America is back" pledged to restore the alliances and revitalize the
United States (US) global reengagement to safeguard the international order. Such
acknowledgment holds the potential to be put to the test with Libya. The Biden administration's
focus seems to pivot towards Asia and less towards the Middle East and North Africa (MENA),
apparently diverting the attention of US foreign policy from the post-Ghaddafi Libyan crisis
(U.S. Department of State, 2021a). Whilst the White House has emphasized resolving some
pressing Middle Eastern regional issues, there remains a strange and troubling lack of
engagement with the prolonged conflict in Libya. Reasonably, in the aftermath of the pullout
from Afghanistan, President Biden is unlikely to overreach in the country. However, as this
thesis will argue, it would also be a mistake for the US to turn its back on a spiraling and
significant regional crisis.
The US Department of State (DoS) rectified former President Trump's apathy toward the
Libyan conflict, but the US strategy in the Mediterranean remains ambiguous. The Biden
administration lacks a clear blueprint for asserting US diplomatic influence in Libya. Such
passivity, exacerbated by intra-European Union (EU) divisions, entrenches the growing
dominance of US adversaries like Russia and China and even nominal allies like Turkey, who
are vying for power through a combination of military, diplomatic, and economic means
(Garamone, 2021). These powers' unchecked influence, coupled with regional actors like the
United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Egypt, is problematic as their support for rival political
factions in Libya could stymie the country's progress toward democratic elections scheduled for
December 24, 2021.
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The detachment of the US increases the risk of continued brinkmanship between regional
and global competing actors. In addition, the US leadership vacuum in Libya may encourage
Russia to bolster its standing along the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)'s southern
flank (Ramani, 2021). This would raise severe security concerns given the potential for Russia's
direct access to the Mediterranean, straining the Transatlantic relationships between the US and
its EU allies. As a result, domestic and external forces and interests have jeopardized any USbacked United Nations (UN) initiatives for Libya's stabilization. This could plunge the country
into an uncontrollable spiral of disorder detrimental to US strategic priorities, meaning stability
and security in the MENA and Mediterranean.
The internationalization of the crisis amidst GPC strategies undermines the of-nationalsecurity-interest US competitive advantage in the MENA. The Libyan conflict has been
progressively shifting into a testing ground for great-power competition (GPC) dynamics. It
reflects a troubling trend in proxy warfare by foreign powers - US foes and allies alike - as
demonstrated by the increasing deployment of foreign mercenaries, mainly Russian, in Libya
(Fishman, 2021a). This thesis contends this is a grave oversight with regard to several US
national security interests that, however, a renovated reengagement animated by a 'Collige et
Impera' (unite and rule) collaborative focus can fix.
The chaotic aftermath of 2011 Libya's uprising created political and security vacuums
that terrorists have also been exploited to settle a deep-rooted operational, recruitment, and
training hub in the country (Sims & Bergen, 2018). Coupled with the complex mosaic of intraLibya competitiveness for power control and war economy dynamics, terrorists' rise and
presence in Libya severely challenge the progress of US-led global war on terror (GWoT) efforts
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(Thompson, 2021). Yet, despite these realities, the Libya crisis does not feature high on the list
of US national security and foreign policy priorities. This is a puzzle at the heart of this thesis.
Libya's fate questions the sustainability of the US's continued marginal involvement in
the crisis. The mismatch between US-stated national security interests and its lack of engagement
in Libya prompted this thesis's leading question of inquiry: what are the national security
implications for the US if it continues to play a marginal role in Libya's post-Ghaddafi ongoing
crisis? The first reality the US administration must address is to determine how important Libya
is. Despite President Biden's efforts to reaffirm the international community's confidence in US
global leadership, the approach to the Mediterranean security - in which the Libya instability fits
as a nonnegligible - as a matter of US national security concern is unclear. Reframing the Libyan
conflict from yet another MENA crisis to an urgent multilateral Mediterranean security challenge
will help elevate the country's profile on the US national security agenda and global stage. The
current situation must be seen for what it is: a potential boiling point on NATO's southern flank,
especially with Russia's dangerous mercenary presence, a humanitarian migrant crisis, an
unresolved terrorism concern, and a historically disjointed European response.
A cursory glance at events on the ground in (and around) Libya since the post-2011
NATO military intervention shows the reticence of the Obama and Trump administrations to
commit meaningfully to a country seen as somewhat on the periphery of the US national security
priorities (Wehrey, 2020). Now is the time for the US to bring scrutiny, care, and wisdom to the
moves of this 'new' GPC reality in Libya before it truly is too late. The instability, fueled by
diverging 'Divide et Impera' type of views and strategies of Russia, China, EU, and NATO
members via proxy interferences on local actors, is not a path for Libya's conflict resolution. This
thesis shows there have already been hugely detrimental impacts on stated US national security
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interests within the Libya crisis and its regional and global ramifications. It explains how and
why this situation has developed and why, absent serious change and US intelligent and
constructive reengagement, these impacts are likely to continue and increase in severity. From
this established reality, the thesis then offers some normative, policy-relevant suggestions for a
reengagement with Libya that recognizes it as a Mediterranean security crisis.
Introduction to Research Design
This thesis outlines a qualitative, within-case study analysis of the ongoing Libya crisis
from a US national security perspective. The project considered the 2011 NATO intervention to
topple the Muammar Ghaddafi regime as its initial chronological reference, whereas the ending
term for analysis was the appointment of the interim Libyan Government of National Unity
(GNU) in March 2021. The thesis does not set out to prove "if the US were more actively
involved, this chaos would not have happened." Rather, it aimed to justify the reengagement
argument by measuring what happened in Libya against the US national security perspective
amidst the awareness of delicate balances in foreign policy and international relations. The
primary research question animated the research design prompting for generating two
subquestions to guide the methodological approach:
What went wrong in Libya? and
What may continue to go wrong from the US national security perspective?
The former aimed at prompting the historical exploration of facts that occurred in Libya
from 2011 to 2021. The collection of data/information was deemed foundational to tracing
events and their impacts on the US. The analysis of findings allowed the project to empirically
explore the longitudinal variation of observable facts to ultimately identify driving forces that
might affect US national security interests, thus supporting the US reengagement in Libya. Such
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a rationale shaped the research design, which developed this logic of inquiry in four
methodological steps.
The first methodological step was process tracing. The purpose here was to explore and
isolate historical, empirical facts (what went wrong in Libya) and link them to outcomes
impactful on the US. This posed a series of challenges: what type of events should be traced to
assess pertinent effects of national security relevance? It prompted the reasoning “those that had
detrimental significance on the US ability to exert its power.” Hence: which tools does the US
leverage to advance its power? This cues to the strategic framework that conceptualizes the use
of the US instruments of national power, namely the MIDFIELD (Military, Informational,
Diplomatic, Financial, Intelligence, Economic, Law, Development). The US Joint Doctrine Note
1-18 supported the reasoning referring to the MIDFIELD as the paradigm the US leverages
outwards to address national security challenges (Joint Chief of Staff [JCS], 2018, p. II-7).
MIDFIELD was then applied as the analytical lens through which to explore and isolate facts
and their outcomes.
The second research methodology step was the causal inference. This was built upon the
initial process tracing and explored longitudinal variation of outcomes to devise causal
mechanisms (George & Bennett, 2005, p. 212). The aim was to assess patterns in the outcomes
to derive US national security implications, or as per the inquiry of reference, what may continue
to go wrong from a US national security perspective and what national security implications the
US may suffer. Identifying mechanisms, correlations, pathways in the outcomes, the thesis built
greater confidence in explaining causality from observable sequences of events (Lieberman,
2001, p. 1016), which in turn aligned in path dependency, the third methodology of this thesis
design, for potential further negative implications on US national security interests.
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The fourth step in the methodological design was normative inquiry. Within this case
study approach, normative inquiry contributed to value rationality gained by combining
empirical observations (from process tracing) with causal assessments (from causal inferences).
This step held unique promise for policy-relevant research, that is, determining assessments for
policy actions (Thacher, 2006). Derived assessments will delve into conclusions relevant to the
policy-based analysis and future research by looking at scale implications to support the claimed
need for a meaningful, renovated US reengagement in the Libyan crisis.
The thesis develops in five sections. First, an introductory assessment of the Libyan
puzzle and its relevance for the US national security, offering a panoramic on complexities and
actors/forces involved in the crisis, combined with a deeper explanation of the research design
and methodology. It also presents a brief assessment of the literature. Second, a process tracingdriven section outlines what has happened in Libya and its impacts on US interests. A third
section builds from that process tracing to apply causal inference as to the key forces driving
negative outcomes in and around Libya and exploring path dependencies to outline how events
are likely to align towards further adverse outcomes for Libya and the US. These two sections
(second and third) form the analytical heart of the thesis, addressing the main questions of
inquiry with regards to implications on US national security if it remains marginally involved.
However, this generates a fourth section using open normative inquiry to explore and advocate
alternative modes of US (re)engagement, framed around understanding the crisis as a
Mediterranean one, not ‘just’ a Libyan issue. Finally, a conclusion that summarizes the project
and opportunities for further research.
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Section 1
The Libyan Puzzle
Despite claimed national security interests to influence its complex path towards stability
and sovereignty after the intervention in 2011, the strange lack of sustained US efforts in Libya
is at the roots of this project’s speciﬁc contribution. This introductory section provides a
contextualization of the Libyan crisis post-Ghaddafi, deemed essential to lay out some empirical,
factual-based fundamentals to frame the methodological approach of process tracing and causal
inference (Rosenau, 1980). The following panoramic introduces the multifaceted plot of issues,
challenges, and actors involved in Libya and the multilayered, complex system of interests that
overlap with US national security ones.
Fueled by the revolutionary thrusts of the 2010 Arab Spring, the Libyan conflict erupted
in early 2011 as a civil uprising that Muammar Ghaddafi violently repressed, justifying the
United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolution 1973, which authorized NATO military
intervention. Since then, Libyans, fragmented by geography, tribe, ideology, and history, have
resisted any non-Libyan imposed directions to pursue a way of reunification, descending into a
complex civil conflict. In the process, Libya has frustrated both NATO and UN efforts to help to
rebuild solid institutions at the national level, preferring instead to maintain control locally, often
supported by foreign backers (Winer, 2019). The civil war-induced instability triggered the
proliferation of terrorism, local smugglers, and criminal gangs involved in drugs, weapons, and
human trafficking. Libyan security vulnerabilities were also stressed by a protracted
humanitarian predicament in Libya, including increased migration and human trafficking routes
from several African countries to the EU. Due to political fragility and internal fragmentation,
several transition governments (Figure 1.1) have existed since 2011 without pursuing any
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sustainable institutional framework, leading Libya into a long-lasting, low-intensity conflict with
an uncertain fate.

Figure 1.1: Political Transitions in the post-Ghadaffi Libya, 2011-2020.

Libya turned rapidly into a chessboard dominated by competing tribal fractionalization
and ambitions for power. This inevitably implied oil facilities and oil revenues appropriation:
since Libya boasts the largest crude oil reserves in Africa and the ninth-largest globally
(Blanchard, 2020, p. 11), it soon became a magnet for troublesome interference from external
actors. In the most recent attempt to forge sustainable stability, the GNU took office on March
16, 2021, to facilitate collaboration between the Tripoli-based Government of National Accord
(GNA) in the West and the Tobruk-based House of Representatives (HoR) in the East and
toward elections scheduled for December 24, 2021. However, it is reasonable to question how
(and if) foes and allies sided in the pre-GNU axes (Figure 1.2) will submit to the Libyan aspired
sovereignty.
8

Figure 1.2: State-Actors Alliances in Libya pre-GNU

This poses a severe challenge to stated US interests. The Pre-GNU alliances system
accounted for Turkey, Qatar, Italy, the UK, and the US backing an internationally recognized
GNA, while UAE, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, France, and Russia were with the HoR/Libyan National
Army (LNA). In the background, China and Iran increasingly weaved webs of and anti-US
strategies by leveraging military assistance (Cordesman, 2021). Such a fragmented scenario was
further aggravated by GPC dynamics, suggesting that none of the outside powers but the US
have an interest in facilitating the reunification of Libya but instead pursued a 'Divide et Impera'
paradigm of breaking the central Libyan power into pieces that, individually, become less
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threatening and easier to manage to their own benefit (Posner, Spier, & Vermeule, 2009). As a
result, greed, power, influence, access and control of Libyan national resources (oil-primarily),
and a sense of survival are likely to remain distinctive features of the Libyan landscape - a
managed, durable instability. This is to the detriment of US national security interests, its
power/influence in the broader MENA, and its competitive advantage within GPC.
Relevance of the Libya Case Study for US National Security
The 2021 Interim National Security Strategy Guidance (INSSG) implicitly justifies
Libya's significance for US national security. Among the strategic priorities in the MENA,
INSSG includes disrupting terrorist networks, addressing humanitarian crises, assisting countries
suffering from poor governance, and a commitment to their sustainable development (The White
House, 2021, p. 11). Libya’s crisis embraces all these elements, self-selecting itself as a matter of
US national security priority in the MENA and the Mediterranean-bordering EU. The INSSG
also reiterates previous National Security Strategies by reaffirming the root requirement to
prevent US adversaries from dominating overseas key regions of US interest (The White House,
2021, p. 9). Being a crossroad between the Middle East, Africa, and the Mediterranean, Libya is
central to areas of US strategic priority where it is of national security significance to upholding
competitive advantage. The unbalance of power in favor of Russia and China may lead to their
growing presence in the country and direct access to strategic resources like oil, natural gas, and
raw material. By consolidating their footprint in Libya, Russia and China may strategically
leverage conflict-dependent chaos, migration crises, and energy needs with the EU to their
advantage bargaining their influence over the main US-NATO allies. Denying Libyan resources'
control to its competitors is key to preventing EU allies in the Mediterranean from becoming
hostages of Russian and Chinese strategic blackmail attempts (Byman & Bjerg Moller, 2016).

10

Not least, the US considers the Mediterranean to be of great strategic importance to keep the
main maritime routes, most notably the Suez Canal, safe for its own trade/commercial interests
and military assets. Plus, there is a further priority to reduce the likelihood of detrimental
tensions between the region's countries, particularly within NATO members like Turkey and
Greece, Turkey and France (Saini Fasanotti, 2020).
The INSSG then ascribes to the leading responsibility of the US to underwrite solid
alliances and partnerships, upholding the role of multinational institutions (The White House,
2021, p. 10). The implicit reference is to the UN and NATO, whose centrality in Libya is an
opportunity the Biden administration could repose as focal of its reengagement approach with a
more prominent and robust US footprint. Retrieving, if not advancing, the common bonds sealed
with the EU partners within the shared Atlanticism, in turn, holds strategic importance for the US
to preserve and favorably maintain its competitive advantage in a region of critical relevance for
its national security interests. Moreover, NATO centrality would help the US re-posit and reroute some NATO members disassociated initiatives (France, Italy, and Turkey) in a collective
NATO policy to contain a threatening Russian presence in North Africa.
US Africa Command (AFRICOM), the geographic combatant command that "employs
the broad-reaching diplomacy, development, and defense approach to foster interagency efforts
and help negate the drivers of conflict and extremism in Africa" (U.S. Africa Command, 2021),
and Central Command (CENTCOM), responsible for directing and enabling operations and
activities with allies to increase regional security and stability in support of US interests in the
Middle East and Europe (U.S. Central Command, 2021), have recently reiterated the urgent
need to proactively protect national security interests at stake in Libya and more broadly in the
MENA. They highlighted how Russia and China have been resolutely and increasingly acting to
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out-compete the US in the region and how Libya could represent a vulnerable foothold to
buttress their influence to the US detriment (Townsend & McKenzie, 2021, p. 35-36). Besides,
so long as Libya sits atop huge energy reserves that confer great wealth and power on whoever
controls them, its strategic importance and the US imperative of keeping it out of hostile hands
will remain, though the US limitedly benefit from its resource (Brands, 2019). Not least, the
intensified internationalization of the crisis and the unsustainable polarization of US allies with
its competitors challenges the holding of the US alliance system. For example, Turkey has
already contributed to a significant split within NATO, leaving the US now facing off France,
Germany, and the UK, who are finding themselves on the same side as Russia (Tsukerman,
2020).
Interestingly and notably, the complexity of interests at stake in Libya has led to forging
unexpected yet instrumental axes among state actors normally on opposing sides. This reality
frames the troublesome implications for the US national security and questions the existing
system of global security alliances that the US must preserve, through a Collige et Impera
approach. Not least, Iran is siding with long-run regional enemies like UAE and Saudi Arabia to
oppose the US and subvert the increasing favor that Israel is winning in North Africa following
the US-vouched Abraham Accords (Bakeer, 2020). The relevancy and urgency of the above
challenges to US national security underlined some implications for a meaningful reengagement
in Libya.
Design and Methodology
This thesis responded to the main research question by framing a qualitative, within-case
study. Hall (2003) argued that qualitative methods, particularly within-case analysis, are useful
approaches toward assessing complex causation even whit a single case study, as per the purpose
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of this thesis. The logic of the research methodology shaped a project’s design that included two
main steps (Figure 1.3). The first one built and framed the analytical backbone of the thesis
based upon the progression of analysis through three substeps: process tracing (step1.1), causal
inference (step 1.2), and path dependency (and 1.3), which will be described more in-depth
below. This first macro step, in its entirety, allowed gaining formal methodological findings that
in turn prompted a richer explanatory discussion presented in the form of speculated patterns and
scenarios. This then facilitated the second step, namely an open normative inquiry that addresses
options for the US reengagement in Libya.

Figure 1.3: Thesis Methodological Design

In the international relations type of research, "only case studies provide the intensive
empirical analysis that can find […] causal factors and historical patterns" (George & Bennett,
2005, p. 214). Given the complex historical, foreign policy type of architecture in which the
context of the thesis was framed, the research applied case study methodology for three reasons.
13

First, case study methods can achieve conceptual validity despite qualitative analysis of nonquantifiable social sciences variables like power, influence, and state interests. Second, case
study methods allow exploring causal mechanisms to explain what caused the effects inductively
across longitudinal chains of evidence. Lastly, case study methods accommodated and addressed
causal complexity in observed relations such as path dependencies (George & Bennett, 2005,
Chapter 1).
Amidst case study methods, the within-case study best fitted the thesis's purpose to
identify causal mechanisms linking a hypothesized explanatory set of variables to an outcome, as
per the guiding lines of inquiry (Mahoney, 2000, p. 409). The distinctive peculiarity of this
project was that the explanatory variables - more accurately, the driving forces of the crisis were the historical facts/events observed, hence not hypothesized. Likewise, outcomes were also
observed and isolated each year. This design best suited the purpose of examining the
longitudinal variation of outcomes in a decade-long timeframe, enabling inferences of observable
patterns and path dependencies. Collier and Collier (1991) demonstrated in a study based upon
historical data that because variables (i.e., in this project, facts traced in the Libyan crisis) and
outcomes were separated by long periods of time (i.e., in this case, 2011-2021), process tracing
could be applied not to prove/disprove causality or spuriousness correlation but instead to
support explanations of why outcomes occurred. Thus, process tracing enabled causal inference,
which allowed for analysis as to what went wrong in Libya, especially regarding negative
impacts on US national security interests.
In case studies research methods, the value of single-case studies is often seen with
skepticism, criticizing the single-observation research design as at great risk of indeterminacy
and measurement error (George & Bennett, 2005, p. 32). However, if a single-case study
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involves many observations, it dramatically reduces such pitfalls. This was precisely the logic to
explore the Libyan case study from a US national security perspective. The substantial process
tracing evidence documented complex interactions revealing a vast amount of observations to
consider. This required a trade-off between information/variables parsimony and explanatory
richness. In order to help organize collected data while preserving validity, the research applied
the MIDFIELD as an ordering taxonomy to separate out areas of observations. This allowed to
drive, narrow, focus, and streamline the analysis of events, impacts, and policy in a more
organized, systematic way (i.e., looking and isolating those relevant to military, informational,
diplomatic, etc. dimensions) while reducing selection bias.
MIDFIELD explained. The Joint Doctrine Note 1-18 codifies MIDFIELD in the strategic
ways and means section to devise options on leveraging the US instruments of power to help
attain the desired end state (JCS, 2018, p. vii). As per this rationale, within the Libyan crisis
context, the desired end state is the safeguard of the US national security interests. More broadly,
when implications on national security arise, the US asserts its national power outward by
leveraging MIDFIELD (Table 1.1). This is to ensure the most suited and effective whole-ofgovernment and international approach to uphold its national security interests (Rodriguez,
Walton, & Chu, 2020).
Table 1.1: MIDFIELD Explained
Instrument of
power (IOP)
M – Military

I – Informational

IOP meaning
The essence of the military IOP is the use of force by one party to impose its will on
another. This use can entail applying force, threatening the application of force, or enabling
other parties to apply force in furtherance of strategic ends.i
The focus of the information IOP is to affect decision-making in the cognitive,
informational, and physical dimensions of the target audience (whether friendly, neutral,
or adversary) to create the desired effect. The informational IOP is about creating,
exploiting, and disrupting knowledge. A state or non-state actor generally benefits when
it enjoys an information advantage over another party. The information IOP is meant to
influence a target audience.ii
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D – Diplomatic

F – Financial

I – Intelligence

E – Economic

L – Law

D – Development
i

The essence of the diplomatic IOP is engagement, meaning how a nation interacts with
state or non-state actors, generally to secure some form of agreement that allows the
conflicting parties to coexist peacefully.i
The financial IOP relies heavily on the Department of the Treasury (DoT), in close
cooperation with banks, corporations, organizations, and international partners, to protect
US financial systems, combat adversary actors, administer sanctions and freeze assets.ii
The focus of the intelligence IOP is the production of value-added data for the commander
or decisionmaker to make informed decisions. Ultimately, the intelligence IOP provides a
decision advantage.ii The intelligence IOP involves national agencies, allied partners and
agencies, host-nation resources, and private sources.i
The economic IOP is used at the political level to influence the behavior of another state or
organization. This is typically achieved through foreign aid, trade agreements, tariffs,
embargos, or economic sanctions. These actions tend to be broader in scope and political
in nature as they impact entire nations. As a result, the economic instrument relies on the
diplomatic instrument to carry out these actions.i
The law OIP pertains to the legal expertise required to understand foreign laws. This aspect
is more strategic and requires synchronization with the diplomatic instrument to avoid
missteps in international and host-nation legal systems, carefully balancing the laws and
interests of all national, international, and foreign entities.ii
The OIP development entails a long-term endeavor. It improves lives, fights poverty,
expands rights and opportunities, strengthens communities, and secures institutions and
governance; and in doing so, it advances global stability, improves security, and projects US
values and leadership worldwide.ii

Joint Chief of Staff. (2018). Joint Doctrine Note (JDN 1-18).

ii

Rodriguez, Walton, & Chu. (2020). Putting the “FIL” into “DIME” growing joint understanding of the instruments of power. National Defense
University Press

Therefore, doctrinally, the MIDFIELD provides an actionable framework to incorporate
global integration for leveraging US instruments of national power alongside multilateral
partners’ capabilities. The application of MIDFIELD fitted the purpose of the research to explore
the Libyan crisis from the US national security perspective. Hence, capitalizing on the
MIDFIELD risk-averse national security rationale (Aftergood, 2018), this project applied the
paradigm analytically to enhance the understanding of what went wrong in Libya and what may
continue to go wrong.
Process-Tracing
Case studies require substantial process tracing evidence to document complex
interactions. Although process tracing grounded in historical contextualization is a methodology
well-suited to testing theories and theory development (George & Bennett, 2005, Chapter 10),
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this project does not aim at that. Instead, process tracing was the foundational effort to infer
causality by tracing historical events through the MIDFIELD analytical lens. This enabled the
identification of causal mechanisms that explained what went wrong from the perspective of
each US instrument of power. In order to trace events meaningfully as per the MIDFIELD
approach, a holistic contextualization of the history that characterized each year preceded the
isolation of observations. Findings were then organized in a matrix, as shown in the template
below in Table 1.2.
Table 1.2: Template for MIDFIELD Matrix
Year

Libyan
Ruling
Entities

Instruments of
power

Impactful events

Effects

M - Military
I - Informational
D - Diplomatic
F - Financial
I - Intelligence
E - Economic
L - Law
D - Development

Besides the visually appealing framework, matrixes presented facts in a way that was
easily accessible for exploring causal mechanisms. A comprehensive 2011-2021 matrix can be
consulted in Annex A at the end of the thesis. The first column indicates the year of reference
from 2011 to 2021. The second column shows which Libyan ruling entities were in the office
each year, contextualizing the events in the existing Libyan political framework. The third
column lists each instrument of national power as per the MIDFIELD paradigm. In the fourth
column, the researcher filtered available information through the MIDFIELD analytical lens to
determine the most impactful events on US MIDFIELD. In practice, for each element of the
MIDFIELD, the researcher explored "why things went wrong in this military, information,
diplomatic,… - areas in 2011, 2012,…?" Based on this reasoning, only military, informational,
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diplomatic, financial, intelligence, economic, law, and development-meaningful events were
extrapolated and condensed in the MIDFIELD template. Finally, in the fifth column, the effects
of the isolated events were derived, thus prompting to assess implications that the US may
continue to suffer, in response to the main question of inquiry. The 2021 MIDFIELD matrix
included events only; the effects were not assessed because of arguments of interest in the
following sections of the project. The challenge was to isolate MIDFIELD-meaningful events in
year-long timeframes.
Causal Inference
An important part of causal inference involves identifying the causal mechanisms that
link an explanatory variable with an outcome. Causal mechanisms can be defined as the
processes through which a set of explanatory variables exert a causal effect on an outcome
(Mahoney, 2000, p. 412). This project captured causal mechanisms across the 2011-2021
timeframe linking the post-Ghaddafi premises to the 2021 status quo. This step of the thesis
design explored and examined how and why situation X evolved into situation Y for each
element of the MIDFIELD framework, helping to observe their longitudinal variation, meaning
what chain of dependent paths caused X to end up in Y over time. In support of this
methodology, Beach and Pedersen (2013) claimed that causal mechanisms were a system of
interlocking parts that transmits causal forces from X to Y rather than a theory about such a
system (p. 26). The authors demonstrated how, within a long period of time, temporal parts
(meaning, observed events isolated with process tracing) could engage in a causal sequence that
explained X turning into Y (visual sample in Figure 1.4) (Beach & Pedersen, 2016, p. 83).
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Figure 1.4: Visual Sample – Capture Causal Mechanism

The same Beach and Pedersen reasoning visual frame was readapted to the need for
analysis in Table 1.3 below to show how premises of the post-Ghaddafi crisis, via causal chain
and path dependency, led to the most recent reality GNU settlement in March 2021.
Table 1.3: Template for Causal Inference Matrix
[Explanatory variable:]
[Causal mechanism:]
[Outcome, as of
March 2021:]

Through the sustained engagement with the literature and events in Libya filtered via
MIDFIELD taxonomy, this thesis identified several major forces conjoining as causal
mechanisms and driving negative outcomes for US interests in Libya with the logics of path
dependency likely to ensure that continues if no counterforces are applied and given how
established they are, even if reengagement is pursued.
These are: the lack of centralized security force, and instead, a complex competing militia
environment developed, fueled by proxies; the impact of an online space feeding disinformation
and division; lack of sustained diplomatic engagement with Libyan authorities (and undermining
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of engagement that does exist by outside powers); financial sanctions created alternative wareconomy-type of revenue streams tied to outside powers and militia environment; inadequate US
intelligence commitment and resources within the country; central bank systems funneled
resources into the competing militia environment; breakdown of the centralized rule of law and
regionalization of power; Libya’s vast resources fueled conflict and outside intervention. Much
of this stems from the early US decision not to fully engage, the departure of even the smaller
on-the-ground resources and diplomatic presence the US did have prior to the Embassy attack in
Tripoli in 2014 (Carlson, 2020), and a subsequent reduction of commitment to Libya alongside
the lack of effective EU and UN engagement vice a dedicated proxy competition fueled by
external actors.
Path Dependency. Causal inference invokes path dependency to assess causal possibility
type of observations. One of the most important contributions of case study methods to the
analysis of path dependence is that they allow for a holistic view of the historical context and a
detailed view of events (Bennett & Elman, 2006, para. 3.1). Structurally, in the thesis, taking a
holistic view allowed for appropriate distinctions between different ‘events of the story’ traced
through MIDFIELD in process tracing and causal process observations. Furthermore, this
allowed inferences about causal mechanisms within the confines of a single case (in this case,
post-Ghaddafi Libya crisis). Thus, causation was not established through intuitive regression,
namely comparison alone, but through uncovering traces of causal mechanisms within the
context of a historical case, also reducing the contestable impact of selection biases during
analysis (Collier, Mahoney, & Seawright, 2004). In other words, the findings of previous steps in
the methodology suggested that within the context of an open-ended case study (as per the
Libyan crisis), it may be reasonable to observe the continuation of paths already observed.
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Those identified warning signs prompted the exploration of scenarios of impactful
interests for the US national security priorities. In the context of the thesis, they strengthened the
argument of existing harmful implications on US national security that urge sustainable
reengagement for prevention or anticipation of even more detrimental outcomes. Lastly, a quite
open normative inquiry discussion addressed options for a reengagement. However, one cannot
neglect the complexities of the previous sections' findings and outcomes. The last section
articulates some ambitious considerations and suggestions for policy-relevant future research.
Document Analysis: Use of the Literature
The examined literature on the Libya crisis did not aim at hypothesis-testing or theory
development; rather, open-source document analysis was primarily used for facts/data collection
and historical accounting. Sources of publicly available information were narrowed down
(although not exclusively) to those with uniform resource locator (URL) like .gov, .edu, .org, .eu
with the intent to enhance authoritativeness in the research. Also used was policy-relevant,
strategic analysis that explored the crisis in Libya in the last decade from the US perspective,
though without neglecting US-related international organizations (UN and NATO) implications.
The process-tracing step prompted the acquisition of historical knowledge and events
accountability in Libya from 2011 post-NATO intervention onward up to the GNU settlement in
March 2021.
The collection of empirical/historical events on Libya was primarily through Jane's
Intelligence Review database. The authoritativeness of Jane's Intelligence Review ideally
minimizes unbiased judgments during collection and provides verified, validated, and relevant
data and strategic, intelligence-based insights on Libya (Janes Intelligence Review, 2020).
Noteworthily, limitations of this approach pertained to the difficulty to trace exhaustively Libyan
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events meaningful to MIDFIELD taxonomy while avoiding case selection bias or
underdetermination. However, the process-tracing matrix framework allowed the organization of
data and information generally dispersed in the narrative of research articles, journals, reports
and difficult to isolate and reference for future analysis. Moreover, the visual order in which
information appears in the process-tracing MIDFIELD matrix eases time allocation of historical
events and facilitates the identification of longitudinal causal mechanisms and patterns relevant
for causal inferences.
Document analysis did not end with Jane's Intelligence Review since case study
methodology combines empirical evidence from several sources (George & Bennett, 2005).
Therefore, information collected from Jane's database was cross-referenced and corroborated
with additional sources with the aim to present information with the highest degree of validity,
veracity, and authenticity, preventing unintentional misinformation in presenting data. Using the
MIDFIELD taxonomy in the queries helped narrow the breadth of the research (e.g.,
“military/informational/etc… relevant events” AND Libya AND 2011/2012/etc.) on web search
engines, including Google, DuckDuckGo, StartPage, Bing. In addition, regional Arab and
Libyan newspapers and magazines, such as Libya Tribune; Libya Herald; Libyan Express;
Marsad Libya; Daily Sabah; The Arab Weekly; The New Arab, were consulted to gain insightful
panoramics of local dynamics and perspectives. When sources were in Arabic, contents were
translated to English using the search engine translate function. In order to cross-validate data
isolated from Jane's Intelligence Review, institutional archives and official reports were also
accessed from US Department of State (DoS) - Libya; US Africa Command (AFRICOM); US
Department of Defense (DoD); (UN) Office of High Commissioner on Human Rights in Libya;
United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL – the most updated archival for resolutions
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on Libya of the UNSC); United Nations Security Council; United Nations Office for the
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA – provide updated analysis, infographics, data,
maps, key contents, official reports of all the UN agencies involved in any UN mission
worldwide via https://reliefweb.int); The World Bank.
The normative discussion was informed by the existing literature on Libya from
secondary, unclassified sources, including publicly available academic articles, newspapers,
scholarly journals, foreign policy magazines, policy research groups, and think tanks. US foreign
policy practitioners, strategists, national security experts and commentators, and policy advisors
have rigorously and routinely scanned the Libyan crisis to debate its relevance for US national
security. Regional and global interests at stake in the MENA often raised questions of the
sustainability of a marginal US involvement in the crisis, considered enabling cause of the
persistency of the crisis, if not for its worsening in terms of interests at stake. It is noteworthy to
acknowledge that the significance of Libya's crisis resolution was never underrated or downsized
per importance in all sources consulted. The collection process hinged around major foreign
policy/international relations think-tanks reports and research, scholarly articles, and academic
journals to yield data reliability and authoritativeness of contents (Gerring, 2018, p. 172).
Overall, the thesis was informed by US-based think tanks, journals, scholarly magazines,
and authoritative institutions, cross-ranging from strategy-focused, foreign policy-oriented to
humanitarian-minded argumentative contents to gain a comprehensive understanding of
MIDFIELD-relevant events. Sources included Congressional Report Services, Belfer Center for
Science and International Affairs, CARNEGIE Endowment for International Peace, Atlantic
Council, CATO Institute, RAND Corporation, American Enterprise Institute, United States
Institute of Peace, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Foreign Policy Research
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Institute, Center for Strategic and International Studies. Stances and degree of agreement on
judgments regarding the US involvement in the Libyan crisis post-2011 NATO intervention such
as alleged absence, partial commitment, detachment, leadership void, and disinterest in Libya
varied.
In order to enhance comprehensive situational awareness, sources with expertise in
MENA reality and NATO/UN policy were accessed. Among the ones that offered the most
relevant analysis and debates on Libya useful for a US perspective assessment, the Australian
Strategic Policy Institute, Middle East Institute, Africa Center, Africa Center for Strategic
Studies, European Council on Foreign Relations, Modern Diplomacy, International Center for
the Study of Radicalisation – Department of War Studies, King’s College London, Italian
Institute for International Political Studies, International Crisis Group, Warsaw Institute.
Altogether, these sources primarily informed the rich explanatory discussion following the causal
inference and path dependency analysis. The consulted reports allowed an understanding of
strategic implications on US national security, contributing to the analysis of the Libyan crisis
from security, intelligence, economic, foreign policy, humanitarian, law, development angles and
contributions. Such a wide variety confirmed the strategic relevance of Libya and the global
interests of multiple international state actors in Libya (Middle East Institute [MEI], 2020). Also,
among various debates and analyses, they discussed the opportunity for the US to lead a Collige
et Impera effort, thus relaunching the competencies, capacities, reliability of its system of
alliances and, not least, the role of NATO within a US-led international system.
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Section 2
What Went Wrong in Libya: Process Tracing a Descent to Chaos
The process-tracing effort built the backbone of historical/empirical knowledge to
identify causal mechanisms aimed at understanding what went wrong in Libya. Before deepening
into the process-tracing effort, a brief contextualization of antecedent to the NATO military
intervention was assessed. We will not debate the justifications that led to the intervention.
However, the following paragraph provides background knowledge that helped sense the prelude
of what became a questionable involvement of the US in post-Ghaddafi Libya. Then, we trace
facts and outcomes for each year from 2011 to 2021, presenting a narrative followed by the
MIDFIELD matrix in which observations were organized.
In the wake of the 2010 Arab Spring's uprisings in Tunisia, violent civil unrest in
Benghazi, Al-Bayda, Tripoli, and Misurata disturbed the Ghadaffi regime in mid-February 2011
(Kuperman, 2013). The regime responded to the rebels' self-appointed leadership group, the
Transitional National Council (TNC), with excessive indiscriminate force and violent repression.
US President Obama's reacted by pointing at the necessity to react against alleged human rights
violations perpetrated by the Ghaddafi regime (Obama, 2011). The international community
promptly adopted UNSC resolution 1973 on March 17, 2011 - no UN members opposed, but,
noteworthily, China and Russia abstained - legally authorizing forceful military intervention
against the Ghaddafi regime based on the responsibility to protect (R2P) principle (Human
Rights Council, 2012, p. 6-7). The resolution entitled UN member states to use all necessary
measures to protect Libyan civilians, but NATO and partner states excluded any "boots on the
ground" option as per TNC's explicit request. This condition limited NATO capacity to air assets
only in support of local rebel militias. Although the US administration was reluctant to
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participate in the Libyan conflict, the impetus for the intervention of France and the UK
primarily convinced the urgency for a NATO commitment. As per at the time admission of the
US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton:
"We asked our allies, our NATO allies, to go into Afghanistan with us ten years ago.
They have been there, and many of them have been there despite the fact they were not
attacked […] They stuck with us. When it comes to Libya, we started hearing from the
U.K., France, Italy, other of our NATO allies. This was in their vital national interests"
(Zenko, 2011).
Foreign interests in Libya extended beyond Libyan humanitarian-inspired security per se.
Regime change and the payoff to EU allies for contributions to U.S.-led GWoT efforts in
Afghanistan and Iraq played a non-negligible push (Zenko, 2011). In the aftermath of the
intervention, NATO and US officials praised a foolhardy triumph, mainly motivated by the
accomplished goal of overthrowing Ghadaffi and freeing Libya to pursue its democratic path.
However, they miscalculated the sustainability of Libyan reunification efforts in the condition of
a limited US commitment that enabled growing foreign actors' involvements and interferences.
2011. The US-led NATO coalition agreed with TNC to non-deploying ground forces and
restored free internet connectivity in the country, failing to forecast the limitation for building
security via air bombing campaigns only and anticipate the weaponization of internet-based
tools. The Ghadaffi regime used to control all communications systems, internet access, and
ownership of mobile devices to prevent opposition groups from conveying political dissent.
TNC's denial of foreign forces' presence in Libya during the seven-month bombing campaign
from March to October 2011 led the NATO coalition to provide internet networks to rebels to
communicate. This entitled them to use social media to help pinpoint and identify targets for
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NATO airstrikes (Ripley, 2011a). However, mutual opposing rebels' militias abused such
reopening to internet networks and widespread availability of internet-based devices to hit
adversarial armed groups rather than regime-related targets. Not least, the plethora of armed
factions in competition for power exploited any available social media platform (e.g., Twitter,
Facebook, Youtube, internet blogs) to spread instrumental narrative and foment unrest
nationwide in line with the Divide et Impera ruling paradigm. Using or avoiding the scrutiny of
social media networks became of increasing concern to US military efforts. In-the-shadow
relations between some NATO members (the UK and France), MENA powers (Egypt, Qatar,
Saudi Arabia, and UAE), and rebels to channel weapons and release frozen financial assets of the
Ghadaffi regime in support of local rebels resistance further hindered the political goal of a postregime Libyan unity at the baseline of NATO intervention (Ripley, 2011b). Altogether, air
bombing-limited military intervention, internet restore, and under-the-radar contacts weakened
the path towards a Libyan-owned centralized coordination authority and security apparatus,
raising the first red flags for the US of the harmfulness of uncoordinated foreign actors'
interference.
Table 2.1: 2011 MIDFIELD Matrix
Year

Libyan
Ruling
Entities

Instruments of
power

M - Military

I - Informational
2011

Impactful events

Effects

The Ghaddafi-rebels established TNC imposed to
NATO/UN to limit military intervention to air
bombing campaigns.

The ‘no foreign boots on the ground’ condition
channeled the execution of military operations to
rebels/local militias in the absence of on the
ground NATO/UN centralized command and
control.
Uncontrolled and unregulated access and use of
internet networks for rebels propaganda and
militias parochial narratives to fuel post-Ghaddafi
fragmentation of power.
Rebels/militias' need to arm their local groups
under the arms embargo prompted the
acquisition of illicit weapons from third-party
actors, either terrorists or state actors.

Restored nationwide accessibility to internet
networks and devices remained unregulated and
easily exploitable for propaganda.

TNC

D - Diplomatic

F - Financial

Appointment and change of two UN special
envoys (Abdelelah al-Khatib with Ian Martin) to
Libya within a year. Settlement of UNSMIL and
imposition of a permanent, international arms
embargo approved by the UNSC.
Alongside the arms embargo, UNSC enacted
freezing Ghadaffi-linked financial assets, bank
accounts, national and international investments.
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Inability to conduct any Libya-funded financial
sustainment to local communities heightens the

I - Intelligence

E - Economic

L - Law

D - Development

Inadequate allocation and deployment of US IC
resources (personnel and budget) compared to
the post-Ghaddafi level of instability.

The focus of central bank efforts narrowed on
funding rebels/militias to pay wages.
In the aftermath of the uprisings against
Ghaddafi, the lack of a centralized judicial
authority resulted in the lack of rule law
delegated to local communities.

Lack of centralized control and management of
critical state infrastructures such as power plants,
water systems, and oil facilities. Critical
infrastructures management soon started to
suffer from in-house corruption.

risk of alternative forms of financing (terrorists
and criminal organizations).
Compromise of US IC efforts (CIA-led) to train
rebel fighters, especially in eastern Libya, to win
Libyans' favor and thus achieve US competitive
advantage in the post-Ghaddafi reconstruction
process.
Spread of illicit forms of businesses among Libyan
communities to generate incomes to self-sustain.
Localized management of the law devolved to
tribal communities/militias increases the risk for
foreign personnel physical security and facilities
and holds potentials for the continuation of
violence/abuses on internally displaced
personnel.
Terrorists increased efforts in infiltrating amid
local militias channeling funds/services to local
communities so as to empower their preaching
and recruitment strategies.

2012. NATO and TNC entitled and empowered local armed groups to maintain security
in Libya, considering militias as force multipliers in an unstable Libya, relying on local armed
groups that, nevertheless, engaged allegiance with terrorist groups. This proved instrumental in
killing the US Ambassador to Libya, J. Christopher Stevens, and three security personnel in
Benghazi in September 2012, which relevantly persuaded US policymakers and the Obama
administration to downsize its involvement in the Libyan crisis, starting the diplomatic pullout.
The resulting US leadership void became progressively filled by foreign powers less concerned
in a functional UN policy to pursue Libya reconstruction but rather a fragmenting interference.
Moreover, because militias' financial revenues depended on outside donors, it made it easy for
extremist Islamist groups such as AQIM, Ansar al-Sharia, and ISIS to play brokers for financing,
accomplishing the goals of infiltrating affiliates in Libyan institutions while buying parochial
loyalties (Marten, 2012). The election of the post-TNC political leading authority in July 2012,
namely the General National Congress (GNC), thus allowed the Libyan Muslim Brotherhood
(LMB) to gain a strong representation within the GNC, causing clashes with tribal conflicting
ideologies and non-Islamist narratives. As a result, GNC proved unable to enforce centralized
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security, leaving unvoided the existing power vacuum, instead filled by better-armed militias that
imposed their rule of law on the ground (Janes Intelligence Review, 2012).
The increased influence of terrorists in militias hierarchies and the enhanced exploitation
of internet platforms to preach their narrative were also aggravating factors during the attack of
the US special mission in Benghazi, culminating with the killing of the US Ambassador Stevens
(Kirkpatrick, 2012). However, different ruling militias remained more prone to managing local
interests and compromise with terrorist financing than committing formally and lawfully to
unification efforts under GNC or any US and NATO direction. A key factor that further fueled
fragmentation was the ambition to control the oil production sites. According to the International
Monetary Fund, oil and natural gas accounted for nearly 96% of total government revenue and
98% of export revenue in 2012 (U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2015, p. 2).
Table 2.2: 2012 MIDFIELD Matrix
Year

Libyan
Ruling
Entities

Instruments of
power

Impactful events
US/NATO's overreliance on local militias to
enforce a security framework inhibited control
over militias affiliations.

M - Military

I - Informational

D - Diplomatic

2012

TNC
GNC

F - Financial

I - Intelligence

E - Economic

The internet and social media weaponization
empowered terrorist organizations (LMB, AQIM,
Ansar al-Sharia, IS) for propaganda.
Appointment of the third special envoy (Tarek
Mitri) to Libya within UNSMIL.
The killing of US Ambassador Stevens to Libya
and three security personnel in Benghazi in
September hampered DoS efforts in Libya and
caused reticence amidst the US administration to
further involve Libyan affairs.
Protracted liquidity crisis and sanctions to
counter the militias-managed market of migrant
smuggling further weakened the financial
system.
The killing of US Ambassador Stevens exposed
the vulnerabilities of US IC covert presence and
operations in Libya.
Increased corruption fueled the central bank
system’s insolvency risk due to unsustainable
salaries payment to politicians and security
providers.

29

Effects
Instances of deception of US and NATO support
for parochial interests proved this strategy
ineffective. Moreover, the growing presence
and grip of Salafi Islamist groups (Ansar alSharia), AQ, and IS among local militias to
target US personnel and infrastructures made
local militias unreliable as security providers.
Powered terrorist recruitment and propaganda
anti-UN/US/NATO mobilized foreign fighters
from neighboring countries to gather in Libya
De-escalation of US diplomatic involvement in
Libya and lack of US leadership for UN/NATO
engagement strategies.

War economy empowers terrorism presence
and increases illicit revenues to finance the
Jihad anti-US.
Reduced operability and maneuverability of
ground assets prompted terrorist infiltration
among Islamist rebels/militias.
Legal ways and means of the economy were
vulnerable to extortion, blackmail, and bribery,
and local communities turned to alternative
war economy types of sustainment to

L - Law

D - Development

Absence of the centralized rule of law and
transfer of power to GNC in July.

Increased risk of disruption of critical
infrastructures (power plants, roads, oil facilities,
water) for competing domestic interests (GNC vs.
non-Islamist militias) hit local communities'
capacity to develop business outside the control
of local armed groups.

guarantee sources of income. It benefitted
criminal activities and terrorists.
Insufficient security for international personnel
and facilities due to the unreliability of local
forms of law control discouraged UNSMIL from
powering its assistance commitment.
Growing exposure to failure of development/
reconstruction UN-funded projects, high risk of
bribery and extortion in exchange for
protection.

2013. AQIM, Salafist group Ansar al-Sharia, and IS-affiliated groups have expanded
their presence in Libya, permeating sympathizing local Islamist militias, infiltrating the oil trade
market, oil facility management, and migrant smuggling across the Mediterranean routes to the
EU. In 2013, over 45,000 irregular migrants from several African countries (e.g., Ethiopia,
Eritrea, Sudan, Mali, Senegal, Nigeria) fled Libya via Mediterranean routes due to a
strengthened partnership between Islamist militias that controlled the coast, local criminal gangs,
and smugglers. (Wright, 2015). They made coastal territories available to criminal groups under
taxation, thus profiting from migrants' smuggling. Additionally, their affiliation with AQIM and
IS raised risks for terrorist infiltration between migrants across the Mediterranean to the EU.
Economic sanctions from the international community in response to human rights abuse on
migrants aimed at dissuading Libyan Islamist militias from partnering with criminal groups and
terrorists in the human trade, but they revealed irresolute. Rather, sanctions pushed the local
Libyan economy towards a war economy based on revenues from illegal migrants trafficking,
systemic corruption, oil smuggling.
To further aggravate the political and security instability, in May, GNC enacted the
lustration law. In practice, it delegitimized anyone who worked with Ghaddafi from holding
public offices or political roles/responsibilities during the country's transition to a unified
government and constitution approval (Winer, 2019, p. 9). Seen as vengeance and one-sided
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justice by GNC-Islamists to consolidate power by wiping out opposing militias and tribal
leaders, this action paved the way for the civil conflict that followed a year later. This tension
also fueled the competition for the control of oil production and revenues, exasperating the
confrontation between the oil ministry and the National Oil Corporation (NOC).
Table 2.3: 2013 MIDFIELD Matrix
Year

Libyan
Ruling
Entities

Instruments of
power

M - Military

I - Informational

Impactful events

Effects

The absence of a centralized Libyan security force
and decentralization of order and control to local
militias prompted the exponential increase of
militias/armed groups affiliates.

Deployment of US/NATO assets limited to special
forces and UAVs to support anti-AQ and IS
operations made it impossible to counter the
growing number of militants affiliated with
militias.
The exploitation of internet means as tools for
widespread propaganda weakened the UNSMIL
narrative of unity among Libyans.
US foreign policy indecisiveness following the
death of Ambassador Stevens resulted in DoS
assets and capabilities’ ineffectiveness in backing
UN efforts to achieve a power-sharing agreement
to avoid clashes erupting between the different
power centers that had previously worked
together to topple the Gaddafi regime.
The financial paralysis triggered local
communities' affiliation with terrorists and
criminals for self-sustainment.

Sustained terrorist propaganda campaign across
the internet and social media by IS primarily.
GNC proved the inability to gain broad authority
consensus among non-Islamist factions.

D - Diplomatic

F - Financial

2013

I - Intelligence

GNC
E - Economic

L - Law

D - Development

International sanctions issued to combat human
rights violations and migrant abuses primarily
burden local communities. They revealed ill
effectiveness in contrasting illicit activities such as
increasing human trafficking, weapons, and drugs
smuggling.
Decreased presence of US IC assistance
programs, primary sources of intelligence for
UNSMIL, amidst increased corruption/deception
of local assets, impacted the effectiveness of UN
policies for crisis management/resolution.
The expansion of the Libyan war economy based
on migrant trafficking, oil smuggling, drugs,
weapons contraband, and abuse of national
revenues to pay minimum wage salaries to local
communities empowered fragmentation.
The ‘lustration law’ enacted in May delegitimized
anyone who worked with Ghaddafi from holding
public offices or political roles/responsibilities
during the country's transition to a unified
government and constitution approval.
The growing armed competition for oil trade
control and oil revenues appropriation paralyzed
the financial and economic systems, thus
hindering the sustainability of healthcare,
education, and labor sustainability.
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Maintained covert interference of third-party
actors destabilized any UN policy or strategy for
conflict resolution, empowering LNA in the East
and prompting a collaboration between coastal
militias, local criminal gangs, and terrorists for
illicit human and weapons smuggling.
Severe risk of bribery, blackmail, extortion, and
illicit taxation of local businesses by militias and
local criminal gangs in exchange for protection
discouraged foreign investment/assistance/aid.
Failure to take action in May 2013 to refuse to
recognize the lustration law that allowed
Islamists to consolidate their power by wiping out
non-Islamist opponents will likely result in future
political-animated clashes.
Terrorists and criminal organizations exploited
the development/provision of essential services
stalemate and economic bankruptcy to expand
their reachability in the country and infiltrate
affiliates in key sectors.

2014. The surge in the number of militia members, from around 30,000 that fought
against Gaddafi's forces in 2011 to an estimated 250,000 in 2014 (Pack, Mezran, & Eljarh, 2014,
p. 2), the increased profitability of the migrant trafficking business, the permeability of the
borders to terrorists, and the ripple effect of the lustration law triggered the first post-Ghaddafi
civil war. Fightings between the two Libyan political entities, the newly elected HoR and the
existing GNC, grew in intensity and violence, forcing the US diplomatic mission to leave Libya.
The two conflicting political entities attempted to seize control of Libya's oil infrastructure and
state institutions amid fighting between rival militias over oil fields, the withdrawal of
international oil companies, and prolonged disruption to the oil production that underpins 90% of
the state budget (Cochrane, 2014).
During 2014 the number of smuggled migrants across the Mediterranean witnessed a
surge of 164%, granting multimillion-dollar incomes to militias and partnered-terrorist groups
(Wright, 2015). The lack of a collective strategy to freeze related illicit financial flows - whether
through sanctions, criminalizing payments, or tracing the funding to organized crime groups
operating smuggling routes from Libya - missed the opportunity to challenge human trade
activities and profits. Also, the lack of a sustained NATO naval counter-operation campaign
prevented tackling the issue, and the sole EU-sustained EUNAVFOR operation, mainly Italian
Navy-based, to patrol the Mediterranean routes could not oppose it effectively (Wright, 2015).
Notably, the US did not contribute with any of the US Sixth Fleet assets stationed in Naples,
Italy, committing to the military support solely with special forces for military assistance and
raids and air surveillance/targeting through UAVs. To further undermine the path to unification
tentatively undertaken, a mid-2014 controversial election to settle a new Libyan legislative body
aggravated the Libyan crisis.
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The newly elected and internationally recognized HoR rejected the Libyan Supreme
Constitutional Court declaration of null election and relocated itself to Tobruk in Eastern Libya,
controlling the Cyrenaica region with the support of the Libyan National Army (LNA), a legacy
of the Ghadaffi Army. On the other hand, the GNC refused to disband and restored itself in
Tripoli with the support of armed Islamist militias, controlling the Tripolitania region in the
West. In late 2014, LNA commander in chief Khalifa Haftar - former Ghadaffi general - started
the HoR-backed fight against Islamist militants pro-GNC, claiming collusion with terroristminded groups (Council on Foreign Relations [CFR], 2021). The political and institutional clash
further weakened Libya's perceived security order, undermining once again the fragile economy,
and producing in-depth political dysfunction (Durrett et al., 2019).
Table 2.4: 2014 MIDFIELD Matrix
Year

Libyan
Ruling
Entities

Instruments of
power

M - Military

I - Informational

D - Diplomatic
2014

HoR
GNC

F - Financial

I - Intelligence

E - Economic

L - Law

Impactful events
The first post-Ghadaffi civil war between HoR/LNA
(led by General Khalifa Haftar, who launched
‘Operation Dignity’) and pro-Islamist GNC was
aggravated by the surge in the number of militiasmembers.
Sustained weaponization of social media by IS
terrorists and affiliates attracted foreign fighters
from neighboring African countries to sustain the
interests of terrorists in Syria and Iraq.
Appointment of the fourth UN special envoy to
Libya (Bernardino Leon).
The evacuation of US diplomatic personnel from
Tripoli to Tunisia due to the increased insecurity
and grown intensity of civil war-related clashes
between HoR and GNC left a diplomatic void
detrimental for UNSMIL.

Labour unrest and scarce access to state funds
amidst the corruption of financial system officials
prolonged the burden on local communities.
Underfinanced and under-resourced US IC
capacities are unable to provide decisionadvantage for US and UN policies.
War economy leading to central bank system
bankruptcy.
The GNC-HoR political and military clashes caused
nationwide protests by armed tribe members over
the central power management and oil resource.
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Effects
Lowered likelihood to achieve a centralized
Libyan security force.

Sustained terrorists' propaganda weakened any
UN-vouched (and US-backed) pro-unification
narrative.
Ill-effective UN brokering effort for peace and US
absence led to ill-coordinated EU diplomatic
attempts (EUNAVFOR mission in partnership with
Libyan coast guard) in contrast to migrant
trafficking across the Mediterranean routes.
The civil war meant that the role of UNSMIL
changed from helping with the transition to
democracy and state-building to a role focused
on peacemaking and conflict resolution.
Increased affiliation with criminal gangs to
benefit from illicit finances and black-market
illicit traffics (drugs and weapons smuggling)
The infiltration of terrorists in the country
reinforced propaganda and recruitment
campaigns amidst LNA-GNC clashes.
Among war economy dynamics, increase of illicit
taxation to local communities for security amidst
clashes for power between GNC militias and LNA.
The consequent severe risk for US personnel
security (armed robbery, kidnapping, ransommotivated attacks) and disruption of US facilities

D - Development

Disruption/threat of disruption of critical
infrastructure, oil, electricity, and water facilities
by militias

in the country persuaded the US administration
to evacuation its diplomatic mission to Libya.
Decrease in available licit fundings from the oil
market to support assistance and aid programs.

2015. IS intensified its co-opt, coerce, and expand strategy in Libya, managing to
overwhelm the US military efforts limited on special forces force assistance and UAVs. The
three-component approach of IS aimed at co-opting local militias, fighting against those who
refute its authority and assassinating political and religious opponents; asserting its legitimacy by
establishing some form of militias governance; controlling transport nodes and energy assets (or
destroying them) to deny its rivals revenue and divert it to the group affiliates. As a result,
domestic clashes between HoR and GNC intensified. In the HoR territories in Eastern Libya,
non-Islamist militias launched numerous operations to rout those affiliated with IS, AQIM, and
Ansar al-Sharia (Wright, 2015). The latter settled training camps for foreign terrorist fighters
traveling to Syria and Iraq, exploiting the security chaos and borders porosity in the Southern
Fezzan and Cyrenaica regions with Niger, Chad, and Sudan. As a result, Libya turned into an IS
regional hub in the MENA, rather than just another territory in which to expand like Syria.
The UNSC facilitated a series of 2015 meetings that resulted in the brokered Libyan
Political Agreement (LPA), also known as the 'Skhirat Agreement,' that prompted an UNendorsed peace deal among HoR and GNC to settle the GNA, a government of unity, in
December 2015 (Fitzgerald & Toaldo, 2016). However, IS activities in Libya expanded their
magnitude and undermined its sustainability since its settlement. IS in Libya established transSahel and Saharan routes for weapons and drugs trafficking, grown in size of its forces thanks to
the influx of foreign fighters from Chad, Niger, Nigeria, Sudan, and Tunisia, and launched
sustained propaganda on social media urging would-be jihadists from the broader MENA region
to join them in Libya (Carlino, 2016).
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Table 2.5: 2015 MIDFIELD Matrix
Year

Libyan
Ruling
Entities

Instruments of
power
M - Military

The IS strategy to co-opt, coerce, and expand in
Libya intensified in violence.

I - Informational

Powered IS propaganda campaign on social
media.

D - Diplomatic

F - Financial

2015

HoR
GNC

Impactful events

I - Intelligence

E - Economic

L - Law

D - Development

The UN successfully brokered the LPA, or Skhirat
agreement, between HoR and GNC to achieve
consensus on the GNA.
Amidst the LPA milestone, the replacement of
the UN special envoy is noteworthy due to
allegations of corruption. Hence, the
appointment of the fifth UN special envoy to
Libya (Martin Kobler).
The persistence of international sanctions and
freeze of national assets tied to the former
Ghaddafi regime hampered the financial
sustainability of existing assets.
Settlement of Salafist-led training camps in South
Fezzan and Cyrenaica, creating drugs and
weapons trafficking routes controlled by AQIM
and Ansar al-Sharia.
Oil revenues diverted from national investments
to pay for security.
Transitional government towards the election of
GNA in December amidst the corruption of
Libyan officials.
Unsustainable educational, healthcare, labor
projects undermined the welfare of local
communities, increasingly prey to terrorists and
militias

Effects
The US funneled military effort on CT operations
providing special forces and UAVs assistance and
support.
Reinvigorated terrorist propaganda decreased
consensus in reunification efforts among Libyans
while increasing radicalization.
GNA's expectations to regain security control of the
country and weaken third parties' influence were
jeopardized by endemic corruption among
institutions and country officials.

Financial CT strategies further undermine the Libyan
capacity to boost the national economy and
regenerate financial activities.
The inability to prevent the expansion of terrorist
hubs in Libya heightened the terrorism threat alert
in the EU and destabilized US foreign in Africa and
ME.
Economic security issues will further aggravate the
war economy dynamics in favor of terrorists and
illicit lines of credit.
Decentralized territorial control facilitated the
terrorist expansion in Libya and illicit appropriation
of EU and UN funds for development and assistance.
US adversaries, state and non-state actors, are likely
to exploit the loss of trust in UN/US aid among local
communities for anti-US disinformation.

2016. While LNA forces were increasingly clashing AQIM, Ansar al-Sharia, and IS to
expel them from Libya, the US intensified military support operations providing special forces
and UAVs to force terrorist groups and affiliates fleeing from major oil-production cities to
prevent them from oil infrastructures control and the monopoly of national oil revenues.
However, bilateral attempts between external foreign state actors and Libyan militias to exploit
oil resources increased. As a result, Libya deteriorated as factions vie for power, and prolonged
violent social unrest disrupted Libya's oil output, plaguing the national economy. The World
Bank estimated that Libya’s gross domestic product in 2016 was at half of the pre-revolution
level, exacerbated by low oil production and prices due to a volatile production environment
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(Chaudry, 2018). Moreover, the GNA establishment did not appease Haftar's rivalry. Haftar did
not recognize the GNA's authority, presenting himself internationally as the legitimate
interlocutor of a fragmented Libyan leadership. Several UN-led peace talks followed since the
GNA took office, but the imposition of the arms embargo and sanctions to deter HoR from
prosecuting the conflict coercively had the side effect to power external foreign actors
interference in the Libyan crisis.
AQIM, IS, and Ansar al-Sharia capitalized on Libya's conflict to strengthen their
influence among sympathizing militias and threaten oil infrastructures, consolidating their
presence in central Libya around Sirte, the largest city-oil-reserve of the country. Large oil
assets, well-established and lucrative smuggling routes to sub-Saharan Africa, and porous
borders made Libya the most favorable country to establish a MENA regional hub of IS
caliphate (Carlino, 2016). In addition, the country turned into the main transit point for North
African militants seeking to reach Syria and Iraq to wage jihad there, serving as a hub for
training and the central pole of attraction for hard-line Libyan Islamists.
Table 2.6: 2016 MIDFIELD Matrix
Year

Libyan
Ruling
Entities

Instruments of
power

M - Military

I - Informational

2016

GNA
HoR

D - Diplomatic

F - Financial

I - Intelligence

Impactful events
Sustained US aerial campaign via UAVs in support
of GNA to free Sirte from IS. In the aftermath,
end of its military campaign against IS targets in
Libya.
LNA intensified propaganda campaigns over the
internet and use of social media to instrumental
narrative to destabilize GNA.
HoR (Haftar) did not recognize GNA authority
despite international acknowledgment of
government of unity.
Immission in the bank system of unauthorized
Libyan currency from Russia to sustain Haftar LNA
personnel and operations boosted clashes
between GNA and LNA.
Porous borders with neighboring countries and
the existence of well-established and lucrative
smuggling routes to sub-Saharan Africa
exponentially hindered the ability of intelligence
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Effects
The US intervention triggered the increased influx
of terrorists and jihadists in Libya, who exploited
border porosity in the South to sustain the fight
against the US.
Inefficacy of UN/US unification narrative.

Under-the-radar agreements/relations between
foreign state actors and Libyan factions of
preference undermined collective diplomatic effort
in support of unity.
Disruption of the financial regulatory system will
render Libya a safe haven for money laundering for
criminal organizations and terrorists.
Eased IS and AQIM control and potential use of
smuggling routes to contraband oil, drugs,
weapons, and illegal goods.

E - Economic

to maintain accountability of terrorists in the
country.
Sanctions further penalized the central bank
system that accepted the illicit immission of
Russian-printed Libyan currency in the economy.

L - Law

Weak GNA leadership could not oppose fake
currency immission by Russian.

D - Development

Power shortages, crumbling health care facilities,
and banking crises undermine social stability.

Such a decision sanctioned the Russian gained
power and influence in Libya, proving a USdetrimental economic dependency of Eastern
Libya, hence LNA/HoR, on Russia.
Increased Russian influence and power in Eastern
Libya will further undermine the effectiveness of
LPA and the reunification process.
The rulers will hardly counter the increment of
unauthorized detrimental initiatives prompted by
external actors for a unified development strategy.

2017. Whilst EU efforts to tackle irregular migration in 2017 have reduced the flow of
illegal migrants via the Central Mediterranean route from Libya, EU aid programs for Libyans
revealed severely underfunded and suffered the further foreign assistance budget-cut of the US
administration. Despite some of the early rhetoric, the Trump administration did not pursue an
isolationist strategy, and bilateral military cooperation, UAV missions, and special forces
deployments were sustained to support the Libyan government in tackling jihadists (Woodside,
2018). Instead, a significant budget reduction affected DoS and USAID for financed assistance
projects for Africa, thus inherently affecting Libyan financial aid commitment, dropping from
USD8 billion to USD5.2 billion (Woodside, 2018).
In terms of the EU commitment to the Libya crisis, the so-called EU Trust Fund (EUTF)
established fourteen assistance programs for EUR3 billion (almost USD3.5 billion) to finance
economic, social, and humanitarian support to the returning migrants and funding business
initiatives and reconstruction. However, less than 10% of the total fundings was made available
(Giovanzanti & Pattar, 2018).
While not implicitly implying a disengagement for African affairs, so much so that the
GWoT to target jihadists instead had priority for the US in Africa, the reduction in the budget for
foreign aid has led to severe intrinsic implications for Libyan financial assistance, hindering the
Libya-led reconstruction and security-building. Also, the assistance programs to Libyans raised
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concerns over the lack of oversight after the readmission of migrants to their communities,
leaving them vulnerable to possible discrimination and trafficking. Politically, no significant
progress was made to reconcile GNA and Haftar. Both sides agreed on a cease-fire in July but
failed to agree on elections scheduled for 2018 (Rowan, 2019).
Table 2.7: 2017 MIDFIELD Matrix
Year

Libyan
Ruling
Entities

Instruments of
power

M - Military

I - Informational

D - Diplomatic

F - Financial
2017

GNA
HoR
I - Intelligence

E - Economic

L - Law

D - Development

Impactful events

Effects

Increased LNA military operations against IS and
Islamists destabilized the positions of
international GNA backers, ambiguously inclined
to let LNA proceed in the fight.
Decrease internet use for terrorist propaganda
but outbreaks of Russian influence operations to
undermine the political unity discourse.
Appointment of the sixth UN special envoy to
Libya (Ghassan Salame).
Substantial US diplomatic retreat of the Trump
administration in support of UN peacekeeping
operations negatively impacted the reconciliation
of GNA and Haftar.
Underfinanced EUTF and reduction of US budget
for foreign assistance in Africa amidst the
corruption of Libyan officials penalized the ability
to support local communities.
Budget cut of the US administration to US IC and
DoS assistance programs in Africa penalized
resources to devote to Libya.

LNA military campaign triggered insecurity
concerns in neighboring countries and within Libya
due to terrorists on the run.

Underfinanced projects for reconstruction and
businesses paralyzed the economic system, thus
unable to support local populations.
The unsustainable absence of a centralized rule
of law forced territorial forms of law control
devoted to local militias.
Rival forces continuos clashes for the control of
energy and oil infrastructures contributed to the
decrease of oil production (hence oil revenues),
resulting in the lack of funding to devote to the
sustainment of local healthcare, energy services.

US adversaries exploit the inflection of terrorist
narratives to spread anti-UN (US) democratization
discourse.
The reduced US diplomatic involvement in Libya
opened to third parties and external interferences
to foreign actors' Divide et Impera strategies.

Alternative forms of financing from illicit
businesses remained valid options of income,
disincentivizing legality.
Reduction of US intelligence capacities to maintain
reliable and current oversight on the Libyan crisis
prompted deception from local assets and
partnered agencies operating in Libya.
Expansion of criminal/terrorist infiltrations in local
economies.
Lack of oversight in the law control and
management prompted human rights violations
and abuses on political rivals, migrants, and the
labor force.
Disruption of NOC authority will lead to
decentralization of oil production to benefit
factional interests, exposing to third-parties
control of oil revenues.

2018. EU and US assistance programs to stabilize local Libyan communities and provide
employment and businesses opportunities in Libya revealed ineffective also due to the high
corruption rate among Libyan authorities and further reduction of the US budget for foreign aid.
Nevertheless, the US maintained its sustained effort to CT priorities through UAVs and special
forces deployment to aid operations against the IS in Libya. However, allegations of Libyan
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officials' involvement in people smuggling challenged the EU on cooperation with the Libyan
authorities to counter migrants' trade across the Mediterranean sea routes (Giovanzanti & Pattar,
2018). As a result, despite the reinvigorated effort of the EU to protect migrants establishing
legal corridors for assistance, the human trade criminal networks radicated and infiltrated deeply
in Libyan institutions that any attempts turned into a failure.
Furthermore, the US administration budgeted a 25% reduction compared to 2017 DoS
and USAID fundings, dropping from USD50.1 to USD37.6 billion, with inherent backfires for
US diplomatic, intelligence, and state-building capacities in Libya (Woodside, 2018). The Trump
administration claimed skepticism of the merits of UN peacekeeping, especially for low-intensity
but long-lasting conflicts in which jihadists were not the sole protagonists and the non-military
facets of bilateral state-building, as per the case of Libya. Such a foreign policy approach
prompted reduced multilateral cooperation, peacekeeping contributions, state-building, and
comprehensive aid programs to favor a unilateral pursuit of CT security objectives and limited
bilateral engagement designed within the GWoT commitment to fight IS and Jihadists.
According to Jane's Terrorism and Insurgence Centre, the effectiveness of LNA
operations against Islamist militants and terrorists was not driven by a high tempo of deadly
attacks but rather by large-scale anti-Islamist militant operations with relatively low levels of
operational tempo (Woodside, 2018). Moreover, even though in May 2018, GNA, Haftar, and
international leaders met in France to end the political stalemate, supporting UN resolution's
plans to run a national conference to plan national democratic elections, weapon trafficking
reinvigorated, and violence became again rampant in the war economy dynamics (CFR, 2021).
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Table 2.8: 2018 MIDFIELD Matrix
Year

Libyan
Ruling
Entities

Instruments of
power

M - Military

I - Informational

D - Diplomatic

F - Financial
2018

GNA
HoR
I - Intelligence

E - Economic

L - Law

D - Development

Impactful events
The prolonged low-tempo, large-scale clashes
between GNA and LNA exasperated the
emplacement of any UNSMIL advanced security
framework.
Low-paced but prolonged propaganda
campaigns spreading LNA narrative and antiunification efforts by LNA foreign backers.
EU-vouched dialogues between GNA and Haftar
amidst external state-actors polarization proved
disunity of effort and lack of coordination in
advancing a UN/EU/MENA shared diplomatic
initiative for stability.
Budget constraints for any financial assistance
program.
Increasing corruption of Libyan officials involved
in illicit businesses further limited reliable
assessments on the policy options for crisis
resolution.
Lack of sustainable bank system exposed to
external pressure and interests related to the
exploitation of Libyan oil revenues.
GNA and Haftar disagreed on national elections
and constitution approval, which did not occur
as scheduled in December.
The unauthorized splitting of the National Oil
Corporation (NOC) into Eastern NOC in the
Cyrenaica under the control of Haftar
jeopardized collective investments.

Effects
GNA resources diverted from the counter-IS fight
to the battle with Haftar.

Backed by China and Iran, Russia will likely expand
anti-UN/US propaganda to delegitimize
reunification.
Third-party conflicting interferences jeopardize UN
capacity to achieve sustainable paths for effective
political dialogue.

Boost for criminal and terrorist illicit forms of
financing local communities and militants.
Endemic corruption among political and
institutional apparatus undermined Libyan's
capacity to achieve sustainable stability favorable
to US dominance in the country, with drawbacks in
the broader MENA.
Increased bilateral agreements with external state
actors will reduce the ability of Libya to recover its
economy relying on external credit.
A prolonged law vacuum boosted criminality and
terrorism while aggravating the humanitarian crisis
of migrants and displaced personnel.
The central bank was deprived of shares of the oil
revenues for sustainable development programs.

2019. LNA military efforts gained praise from US President Trump, who ambiguously
exposed himself in favor of Haftar's for his role in fighting terrorism in Libya while officially the
US was siding with the internationally recognized GNA. DoS acknowledged the critical role of
Haftar in achieving a "stable, unified, and democratic" country, but at the same time pointing out
his destabilizing responsibility for a democratic blueprint (Gilsinan, 2019). In April, LNA
launched a military campaign to seize control of Tripoli with the support of Russia and the
consensus of Egypt, France, UAE, and Saudi Arabia. Outsiders' polarization marked EU actors'
divisions: while France aligned with LNA, Italy and the UK continued to side with GNA. This
complex system of under-the-radar alliances triggered a Turkish-Qatari arrangement with GNA,
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officially to contain Russia's expansionism in the MENA harmful to Turkish "new-Ottoman"
foreign policy ambition, that implied influence and presence expansionism in Libya.
Table 2.9: 2019 MIDFIELD Matrix
Year

Libyan
Ruling
Entities

Instruments of
power
M - Military

I - Informational

D - Diplomatic

F - Financial
2019

GNA
HoR
I - Intelligence

E - Economic

L - Law

D - Development

Impactful events
Decisive LNA military operations to occupy Tripoli
and take power by territorial expansionism in the
form of an anti-Islamic-terrorist campaign.
Russia enabled the ideological propaganda
campaign of LNA to win tribe members' support
in the Fezzan and Tripolitania region during the
Haftar campaign.
Ambiguous verbal support of President Trump in
favor of Haftar operations to free the Tripolitania
region from Islamists.
Provision of financial incentives by Haftar (backed
by Russia, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and UAE) to buy
consensus among local tribes during the LNA
advance to Tripoli.
Increased presence of Russian mercenaries to
assist LNA military training raised concerns for
counter-intelligence efforts on US/NATO
equipment and assets.
Amidst the endemic corruption of bank system
officials, GNA funding appeared sustainable,
while LNA funding was mainly based on a
predatory economy.
The rule of law remains managed by local militias.
Armed groups on all sides continued to kill
unlawfully and shell indiscriminately, killing
civilians and destroying vital infrastructure.
The conflict hampered the provision of basic
services, including health and electricity, fueling
migration and displacement.

Effects
Russia deployed jets, UAVs, and mercenaries in
support of the LNA military campaign.
Substantial anti-UN/US misinformation and
disinformation campaigns ill-impacted the US role,
power, influence in the country.
US ambiguity will undermine Libyan-Libyan
dialogue and prompt increased external
interferences to fragment the political instability
further.
Disruption of any licit financial framework and
advancement of alternative financial support from
US competitors in the MENA implied progressive
loss of financial influence in the region.
Expansion of Russian influence and power to
leverage anti-US interests in the broader MENA
also posed security risks on NATO's southern flank.
The disproportion of economic assets of GNA and
LNA exasperated the rivalry between the oil
ministry and the NOC in competition for the
control and management of the oil and gas sector.
The criminal justice system remained dysfunctional
due to impunity, insecurity, and armed conflicts.

The increased number of internally displaced
personnel and migrants aggravated the
humanitarian crisis of migrants fleeing across the
Mediterranean routes towards the EU.

2020. Within the UN-endorsed Libyan Political Dialogue Forum (LPDF) effort, the UNbrokered '5+5 Libyan Joint Military Commission' (JMC) in January 2020 set up GNA and LNA
consensual reconciliation agreements. Although it resulted in the commitment to withdraw
troops from the front lines, expel foreign fighters, stop foreign military training, JMC lacked
inclusiveness, sidelining the representativeness of minor communities, especially from South
Libya. Despite the agreed terms, both sides soon backtracked, raising the concern that noncompliance with the cease-fire will increase the risk of returning to internal conflicts (Malley,
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2020). In August 2020, Turkey, Qatar, and the GNA signed the so-called Trilateral Protocol to
establish a training center for GNA forces and deploy a joint military cooperation platform. As a
result, Haftar's offensive against Tripoli ultimately failed (Saini Fasanotti, 2021). On October 23,
2020, GNA and LNA representatives reunited in the 5+5 Libyan JMC reached a cease-fire deal
in Geneva. It was supposed to set the stage for a discussion between GNA and LNA that returns
to the security and political level, but none of the Libyan key players and their foreign backers
backtracked, despite the commitment to end foreign interference in Libya's internal affairs
(International Crisis Group, 2021). Nevertheless, it did seem to have resolved some of the
longstanding, distracting diplomatic friction between the UN and the AU regarding Libya,
putting the UN front and center. Libya may indeed be an African problem, but it is also of
MENA, EU, and US concern notwithstanding (Feltman, 2020). Besides, it called for establishing
a functioning parliament and forming a single, unified, inclusive, and effective Libyan
government approved by the HoR (Blanchard, 2020, p. 6).
Table 2.10: 2020 MIDFIELD Matrix
Year

Libyan
Ruling
Entities

Instruments of
power
M - Military

I - Informational

2020

GNA
HoR

D - Diplomatic

F - Financial

I - Intelligence

Impactful events

Effects

Continuation of LNA operations amidst the
pandemic spread until August, when GNA
achieved an agreement on a ceasefire by LNA.
LNA sustained social media presence, whereas
western militias are less cohesive in their online
activity. Disinformation and misinformation
regarding the Covid-19 pandemic by Russia and
China.
The resignation of the sixth UN special envoy
was filled ad-interim by Stephanie Williams.
The LPDF outcomes agreed on a nationwide
ceasefire, expelling foreign fighters, suspension
of third-party military training programs.

The fights displaced nearly 28,000 people in
western and central Libya, aggravating migrant
crisis management.
Russia has been vital for helping the LNA improve
its brand and to disparage its opponents. Russian
actors have sponsored and disseminated online
news media and Facebook on several occasions,
including anti-US propaganda.
Amidst LPDF talks, the marginal role of the US in
the dialogue process weakened its ability to
leverage influence in the resolution strategy, also
increasingly compromised by Turkey seeking to
expand its trans-Mediterranean power to counter
the Russian axis (in turn, reinforced by China and
Iran in the background).
The decrease in national revenues from the oil
market halted any ongoing financed projects and
risked fueling social unrest nationwide.
China backing Russia's sympathy for Haftar and
Turkey advancing its strategic security coadministrator role aside GNA to expand its own
security, diplomatic, and commercial power in the

The shutdown/blockade of oil terminals and
sales led to a national budget collapse.
Russian mercenaries and Chinese military
advisers in Libya amidst UN requests to zero
foreign presence erode US/NATO competitive
advantage in the country and the MENA.
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E - Economic

L - Law

Mediterranean exasperated GPC dynamics to the
detriment of US role in the MENA.
Libyan institutions are prone to receive any form of
economic relief from the economic crisis.

Contraction of the economy by 12% due to
Covid-19 imposed budget cut to local
communities.
The absence of a centralized authority to
manage the rule of law enabled continued
human rights violations.
LNA's blockade of oil terminals amidst the
increasing spread of the Covid-19 pandemic.

D - Development

The inability to guarantee security and the
dysfunctional judicial system aggravated the
humanitarian crisis of migrants fleeing to the EU
and migrant workers' condition within Libya.
The collapse of the weak healthcare system,
amidst the pandemic, due to lack of financial
resources to treat Libyans and buy the vaccine
attracted US-adversaries, China primarily,
incentivizing foreign vaccine diplomacy initiatives.

2021. The success of the elections in December is a necessary, foundational enabling
condition for any political, security, and economic stability in Libya. The GNU, which was
sworn on March 16, emerged from the UN-sponsored Libyan political dialogue forum (LPDF) in
Berlin, plans to oversee this transitional period and focus on unifying split government
institutions, holding democratic elections, and distributing oil revenue transparently and fairly
(Elbakoush & Wilson, 2021). Libyan GNU Prime Minister Abdulhamid Dbeibah committed to
focusing on Libyan vulnerabilities, ranging from social to economic security (Lassoued, 2021).
As much as it is unrealistic to expect GNU to go from a system built on corruption to one based
on full transparency before the elections, the UN and US powered their efforts to support
successful elections. The World Bank projections forecasted a substantial rebound of the Libyan
economy in 2021 and 2022 if oil and gas sectors recovery persists within a context of reunified
management between the oil ministry and the NOC (The World Bank, 2021).
Table 2.11: 2021 MIDFIELD Matrix
Year

Libyan
Ruling
Entities

Instruments of
power
M - Military

2021

GNA
HoR
GNU

I - Informational

Impactful events
The agreement on a ceasefire between LNA and GNA and the agreed termination of foreign military
interference in Libya allowed GNU establishment, with the promise to peacefully transition towards
scheduled democratic elections in December.
Amidst Russian and China vaccine disinformation, the UN vouched for a cross-sponsored endorsement
for GNU across Libya's media and news platforms.
GNU Prime Minister Dbeibah has been aided by an unprecedented effort of the US and UN to boost
pro-GNU propaganda across social media at home and abroad.
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D - Diplomatic

F - Financial

I - Intelligence

E - Economic

L - Law

D - Development

Amidst the seventh UN special envoy to Libya (Jan Kubis) appointment, LPDF formally convened in
January and successfully led to GNU settlement in March as per agreement between GNA and HoR to
transition elections in December and issuance of a new constitution.
The US technical support is well underway with programs to assist Libya’s High National Elections
Commission.
GNU committed to providing state funding from Libya’s oil wealth to both GNA and HoR factions in an
attempt/effort to mitigate the conflict for oil production sites control and fairly balance the access,
allocation, and attribution of oil revenues.
The US co-chairs an international working group to unite Libya’s financial institution after years of
separation.
Vaccine diplomacy efforts by China and Russia and the increased presence of military consultants for
security force assistance/training of Libyan militias undermine the under-resourced capacities of the
US IC to maintain decision and competitive advantage in Libya favorable to broader MENA policies and
strategies.
Following a massive economic contraction in 2020, Libya’s oil and gas sector, and in turn its economy
overall, is witnessing a significant rebound. According to the World Bank data, if presidential and
parliamentary elections succeed, stability could project Libya to a forecasted GDP growth rate of over
70 percent in 2021.
The criminal justice system and law enforcement authorities remain only partially functional. Civilian
and military courts operate at reduced capacity amidst armed groups who continue to intimidate,
harass, threaten, physically attack, and arbitrarily detain journalists, political activists, migrants, and
displaced personnel enacting restrictive laws that undermine freedom of speech.
Amidst the severe negative impact on social-service delivery systems of the protracted conflict and the
COVID-19 pandemic, the UN endeavored to strengthen the education and healthcare systems and
grant access to quality basic services for all people in Libya across health, protection service, food, and
nutrition sectors.

The matrixes above allowed the researcher to mature knowledgeable insights on the postGhaddafi Libyan context and isolate what went wrong in Libya via MIDFIELD lens/filter
application. The goal was to identify the meaningful events that precluded the functional
leverage of each US instrument of national power in Libya regardless of the level of US
commitment. This prompted to address the next line of inquiry, what may continue to go wrong
in Libya for the US. Data organized in the table and filtered through the MIDFIELD lens
facilitated the derivation of causal mechanisms.
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Section 3
What Will Continue to go Wrong: A Causal Inference and Path Dependency Analysis
This section located causal mechanisms in the 2011-2021 timeframe by observing the
longitudinal variation of effects for each element of the MIDFIELD taxonomy. Since
explanatory and outcome variables were separated by long periods of time, Collier and Collier
demonstrated that casual mechanisms could be used in causal inference built upon process
tracing to support the researcher's explanations of path-dependencies (Mahoney, 2000, p. 414).
The complexity of the Libyan reality suggested intertwined relations between all elements of
MIDFIELD as con-causes within the crisis. In other words, a certain military event may cause
effects with diplomatic or economic implications, and towards deeper or even new military
events – and so on. Nevertheless, the goal was to isolate all the co-funding variables so as to
focus on every single instrument and explore events as per their military, informational,
diplomatic, etc., relevance. As much as facts may seem redundant and repeated throughout the
MIDFIELD taxonomy, they contributed to diverse causal mechanisms.
The causal chain for each element of MIDFIELD first isolated the observed explanatory
variable, then processed the causal mechanism outlining the patterns of events within, and
ultimately reported the most recent outcome on each specific US instrument of power.
Following, the subquestion of what may continue to go wrong prompted the assessment of richer
and deeper explanatory discussion developing scenarios impactful on US national security that
prompted further considerations discussed in the next normative inquiry section.
Military
[Explanatory variable:]

In the aftermath of NATO's 2011 airstrike campaign, the US, UN, and NATO neglected
a security forces assistance effort to build a centralized Libyan security apparatus.

[Causal mechanism:]

The lack of command and control on local armed groups was aggravated by
the arms embargo imposed by the UN, which in turn prompted militias to
acquire/accept weapons alternatively.
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This offered the pretest to third-party MENA powers to channel weapons and
equipment to proxy Libyan factions.
The militias’ need for arming their militiamen to prosecute the fight was also
exploited by terrorist groups, AQIM, IS in Libya, and Ansar al-Sharia primarily, who
bargained weapons provision with affiliation.
This triggered the expansion of terrorist grip in Libya, which soon became a
MENA regional hub for training and recruitment of foreign fighters to send in Syria and
the horn of Africa.
The increased presence of Islamists in the country further aggravated
domestic fragmentation with non-Islamist communities. LNA vigorously claimed its
authority as the sole institutional Libyan army responsible for freeing Libya from
Islamist militias and its affiliates, which ironically sided with the internationally
recognized GNA political entity.
AQIM, IS in Libya, and Ansar al-Sharia took advantage of the security
instability to expand their strategy in Libya, aiming at controlling oil facilities in Central
and South Libya.
Robust US deployment of special forces and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV)
for CT operations.

[Outcome, as of
March 2021:]

In this wake, LNA intensified military operations against Islamist militias in the
West, claiming their affiliation with terrorists. The prolonged military campaign
prompted LNA agreements with pro-LNA outside powers to acquire weapons and
equipment (despite the UN arms embargo).
The pro-LNA axis of foreign powers (Russia, Egypt, UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Iran)
increased military assistance channeling weapons (ranging from guns to ballistic
missiles and air defense systems), vehicles, UAVs, aircraft to Haftar, alongside
mercenaries and military advisors (China) to provide training to LNA affiliated armed
groups. In response, Turkey and Qatar signed a military agreement with GNA
deploying naval and army forces in Libya.

What may continue to go wrong? First, supposing the foreign actors' unregulated, proxy
military presence persists, it is highly likely to witness the continuation of the power struggle
between the two existing rival political factions, namely the GNA and LNA, regardless of the
GNU and the aspired goal of elections in December. Ironically, the justifications that motivated
MENA actors (e.g., UAE, Egypt, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia) and NATO countries (e.g., France,
Italy, and Turkey) to intervene in order to prevent the rapid descent of the crisis into intra-militia
fights are now the same that hamper their disengagement to maintain their footprints in Libya.
Second, the threat of institutionalization of proxy external military support (i.e., mercenaries) to
provide the Libyan security framework may severely erode the ability of the US to leverage its
military power for GWoT-related US national security interests. AFRICOM has warned that the
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Russian military presence in Libya threatens US military partnerships in the MENA, further
aggravated by under-the-radar financing of actors like UAE and Egypt to Sudanese and Chadian
private companies' training and paramilitary operations, besides Russian and Syrian's. Also, it
may severely undermine CT cooperation within the GWoT effort by impeding US military
(either special forces or UAVs assets) access to Libya (Senate of the United States, 2021, Sec.
102). Third, as a result, the US dominance in the MENA, a key strategic region for US national
security interests, would be severely put in jeopardy by US competitors able to provide military
means alternatively to the US, Russia above all. In this regard, Libya is likely to be exploited as
the Russian ‘Trojan horse’ to enter an increasing number of Russian forces and equipment given
its Russia-accessible geostrategic outlet on the Mediterranean. As per the same logic, it cannot be
ruled out that Russia will exploit Libya as a 'friendly' entry point to escalate the presence and use
of private military companies (Wagner Group primarily, but not exclusively) across Africa
(Cragin & MacKenzie, 2020). Not least, Russia's military presence in Libya would threaten
NATO's southern flank, threateningly allowing the projection of its military power in the
Mediterranean. This would bridge the maritime gap and achieve the geographic proximity of its
multidomain assets to the EU. Moreover, the Russian and Iranian partnership in Libya is also
crucial to the (in)security issue as the increase in the flow of mercenaries and weapons from
Russia and Syria further destabilized the weak Libyan security apparatus, explicitly violating the
in-place UN arms embargo. The magnitude of such extensive foreign interference is deepened in
the following diplomatic matrix.
Informational
[Explanatory variable:]

Restored nationwide access to internet networks to broadcast information and
communication, previously under censorship-type of control by the Ghaddafi regime,
prompted uncontrolled weaponization of internet-based contents and social media
platforms.
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[Causal mechanism:]

Terrorist groups initially exploited the lack of institutional, centralized
oversight of internet platforms, IS and Ansar al-Sharia primarily, for preaching and
recruitment purposes.
Terrorist propaganda intensified within-Libya Islamist militias and attracted
foreign fighters from neighboring African countries.
Lack of information/communication control contributed to eroding the
diplomatic effort in support of GNC first and GNA later.
LNA exploitation of the internet and social media propaganda anti-GNA via
proxy Russia expertise in using internet tools for disinformation and misinformation.

[Outcome, as of
March 2021:]

Russian and Chinese disinformation campaign during the Covid-19 pandemic
aiming at vaccine diplomacy to the detriment of the US amidst pro-GNU media
endorsement.
The UN-endorsed effort that led to the GNU settlement was accompanied by
information and communication strategies to promote Libyans' pre-election and
constitution approval narratives.

What may continue to go wrong? First, foreign actors' weaponization of the Internet will
likely continue to spread parochial propaganda, capitalizing on the harmful effects of Libyans'
digital illiteracy. Russia will highly likely use, if not increment, information operations, defined
as coordinated efforts to manipulate or corrupt public debate for the strategic goal to pursue
competitive advantage over an opponent (RAND, 2021), in order to advance proxy narratives of
interests to discredit the democratic path and US/UN/NATO role as reliable brokers for stability.
According to the 2021 Facebook Threat Report, Russia ranks first per generated information
operations contents, and Libya results among the most targeted country of such conduct
(Facebook, 2021, p. 7-8). It is safe enough to assume that Russia is active in Libya, exploiting
the vulnerabilities derived by the prolonged crisis. Second, it is safe to assume that social media
will highly likely continue to be used by terrorists for recruitment and preaching purposes. Third,
foreign state actors and proxy groups will likely continue to fuel narrative warfare via
misinformation and disinformation to undermine reunification and sovereignty, regardless of the
UN's auspice of compliance to support the GNU. The lack of authoritative Libyan oversight on
the state-owned Libyan Post Telecommunications and Information Company, the Libyan holding
that manages the communication systems in the country, further aggravates such risk. Lastly, the
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media and broadcast services in Libya are highly likely to remain vulnerable to corruption and
instrumental interference (Chaudry, 2018).
Diplomatic
[Explanatory variable:]

Under-the-radar interferences of foreign state actors since the 2011 post-revolution
fueled further fragmentation and routinely jeopardized any UN-brokered (and USweakly-backed) attempted political dialogue among Libyan factions.

[Causal mechanism:]

The UNSC-approved arms embargo in Libya induced external actors (i.e.,
terrorists and MENA powers primarily) to covertly equip Libyan armed groups
increasingly fractionalized to pursue their own interests in a war-torn Libya suffering
security/power-vacuum.
The killing of US Ambassador Stevens in 2012 and three security personnel
further reduced US diplomatic involvement in Libya, affecting the UN/UNSMIL's ability
to broker sustainable political solutions for Libyan reunification, which ultimately
resulted in a new escalation of violence and clashes among rival factions.
The intensification of clashes in Libya led to the evacuation to Tunisia of the
US diplomatic mission in Libya. That void was filled by growing interference of outside
powers and US competitors, also affecting EU members' (UK, Italy, and France)
uncoordinated attempts to stabilize the country.
UN/UNSMIL attempts to promote sustainable dialogue among rival political
factions (GNC and HoR first, GNA and HoR/LNA after) proved ineffective due to
persistent third-party support and internationalization of interests within Libya that
materialized the pro-GNA axis vs. the pro-LNA axis (Figure 1.2).

[Outcome, as of
March 2021:]

Amidst misalignment between UN official intents and reality, the UN/EU/USbrokered LPDF achieved GNU appointment under conditions of questionable fair
representation of parties and powers within.
GNU, constituted upon GNA and HoR agreement and supported by the international
community, is transitioning Libya and Libyans to the milestone of the elections on
December 24, 2021, and the approval of a new constitution.

What may continue to go wrong? First, diplomatic disunity among state actors involved
in Libya is likely to hinder the tenure of the recently settled GNU. Its failure to assist the needed
reforms preparatory to the elections in December, or the failure of elections themselves, will
likely result in conflict resurgence. Second, prolonged outsiders' interference and growing,
incisive polarization of existing alliances (Figure 1.2) will be severely detrimental for the US, its
system of alliance in the MENA, and any UNSMIL initiative. The UN, indeed, in the case of a
re-escalation of violence in Libya and a potential consequent absence of shared consensus on
what and how to do in Libya, will not be able to practically leverage the tools and power needed
to oppose state actors' reticence for a common crisis-resolution strategy (El-Gamaty, 2020). The
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challenge for UNSMIL posed by a rooted internationalization of the Libyan crisis is aggravated
by the absence of a US diplomatic presence in the country. This prompts the third consideration:
the absence of US diplomatic presence in Libya is likely to hamper any attempt to reunification,
fueling the narrative of a non-interest of the US in the Libya crisis to favor US competitors and
pro-Divide et Impera harmful policies that would exacerbate instability. Also, the US's
undecisive foreign policy budget support to DoS of two past presidential administrations for
assistance programs Libya encouraged competitors and allies to fill the Libyan vulnerabilities by
committing to Libya on personal accounts, often pursuing competing interests with those of the
US. Russia, Turkey, and major MENA actors have reasons to subvert GNU success since it may
imply threatening their interests to favor Libyan sovereignty (Badi & Lacher, 2021).
Financial
[Explanatory variable:]

Imposed sanctions on Libya prompted local militias to look for alternative financial
ways and means to access revenues.

[Causal mechanism:]

Due to the regime-owned control of all Libyan financial assets, freezing
regime-related assets in the post-revolution to prevent unauthorized appropriation
resulted in Libya's financial paralysis.
This triggered militias to look for alternative forms of funding to self-sustain
themselves and their operations. Often, militias turned into illicit activities such as
migrant smuggling, weapons, and drugs trafficking, or affiliation with terrorist groups
to make profits.
Amidst underfinanced EU and US financial programs support and protracted
liquidity crisis in the Libyan banking system, Russia started to print and inject
unauthorized Libyan currency into the financial system to support LNA.
LNA used Russian-printed currency to buy consensus and finance its 2019
military campaign to topple GNA.

[Outcome, as of
March 2021:]

The intensification of clashes provoked the shutdown of oil production and
sales, leading to national budget collapse.
GNU committed to providing financial fundings from Libya’s oil wealth to both GNA
and HoR factions to support a successful transition to elections in December.

What may continue to go wrong? First, without anti-corruption assistance from the
international community, the Libyan financial system is likely to continue suffering liquidity
crises and endemic money laundering risks (Binici & Kirikçioğlu, 2019). Over the decade, such
financial precarity discouraged EU and US aid projects in North Africa, specifically in Libya.
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Second, by leaving international financial assistance programs underfunded, legal forms of the
economy will continue to prove insufficient to sustain livelihoods. This would likely force
militias and armed groups to look for profitable alternatives in criminal activities, further
aggravating migrant, security, and humanitarian crises. Third, bureaucracy, corruption, and rising
crime associated with poorly controlled financial oversight will likely continue devaluing the
attractiveness of investments, discouraging legitimate private sector initiatives from within and
from outside investors (World Bank Group, 2020, p. 25-26). Not least, Libya's fragile and
conflict-affected environment still results in a low tax base, discouraging long-term national
investment (Chaudry, 2018).
Intelligence
[Explanatory variable:]

Inadequate allocation and deployment of US IC resources (personnel and budget)
compared to the post-Ghaddafi level of instability.

[Causal mechanism:]

This undermined the US IC effort to win rebel favor for pursuing outcomes
favorable to US/UN policies, resulting in chaos and persistent violence among rival
armed groups.
Infiltration of terrorists amid militias was a con-cause of the attack in Benghazi
to target US personnel.
Decreased budget to support US IC assistance programs in Libya resulted in
decreased control and containment of terrorists.
Increased deception by US foes and allies for parochial interests.

[Outcome, as of
March 2021:]

Growing presence of US major adversaries (i.e., Russia and China) in the
country raised concerns of counter-intelligence efforts detrimental to the US and
NATO.
Russia and China exploited the healthcare burden caused by the pandemic in Libya,
advancing vaccine diplomacy to strengthen their influence and power in the country
and the broader MENA leveraging humanitarian security type of means.

What may continue to go wrong? First, again, the persistence of foreign powers'
interference in Libya is highly likely to intensify and multiply instances of denial and deception
strategies of foreign intelligence services. Russia and the MENA powers axis pro-LNA have
been repeatedly uncompliant with UN directions, disguising military and economic assistance to
support the fight against GNA with humanitarian-type of support to the Eastern Libya
population. This approach could impact the lawful conduct of the elections or alter the outcomes.
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In this context, the US budget reduction for US IC assistance programs in Libya may de-power
the capacity to anticipate or forecast US competitors' policies and actions to the detriment of the
US policy tenure in the MENA. Also, NATO may increasingly suffer the intensification of
Russian dis/misinformation and counter-intelligence efforts detrimental to US competitive
advantage both in the military and diplomatic capacities, as acknowledged by the director of US
AFRICOM public affairs (Karns, 2020).
Economic
[Explanatory variable:]

In the aftermath of the 2011 revolution, the central bank system channeled national
resources to pay wages to militias who overthrew the Ghaddafi regime.

[Causal mechanism:]

Surge in the number of militia affiliates that weighted on the national
economy resources for payments.
Corruption among bank system officials to channel and prioritize funds
towards armed groups instead of Libyans.
Crisis of liquidity aggravated by the shut down/blockade of oil production sites
that became targets for power management.
Revenues from oil sales increasingly suffered illicit appropriation by terrorists
and militias to finance their strategies, depriving the corrupted central bank system of
solvency.
This triggered war economy alternative forms of income (e.g., human
trafficking, which aggravated the migrants' crisis to EU), leading to central bank system
risk of bankruptcy.

[Outcome, as of
March 2021:]

Russia exploited this vulnerability by creating LNA dependency on its
economic support, prompting other countries to get more involved economically as
proxies of GNA or LNA.
Data suggests that if presidential and parliamentary elections succeed, stability and
the expected rebound of Libya’s oil and gas sector could project Libya to a substantial
economic recovery.

What may continue to go wrong? First, the fight over the control of oil resources in Libya
is highly likely to persist. As Libya's leading economic source of income, the oil sector is highly
likely to remain a victim and target of within-Libya and external powers' competition for its
control. Second, given that the Libyan national economy is overly dependent upon oil revenues,
the lack of differentiated forms of the economy is likely to continue boosting illicit activities
linked to easy-profitable yet illicit, war economy businesses (e.g., terrorism, human trafficking,
local criminality). Third, the endemic corruption among the institutional apparatus of the two
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political factions (GNA and HoR/LNA) will be detrimental to US/UN efficacy of assistance
programs. Libyan authorities pointed out that government officials consumed 65% of the
national budget in 2019 and 2020, yielding the depths of corruption in the country (Lassoued,
2021). Since 2011, the US DoS has invested over $850 million in Libya’s overall development
(U.S. Department of State, 2021b); however, the unreliable economic management channeled the
budget towards security priorities rather than development. Also, under-the-radar money flows
inward and outward will likely turn Libya into a money laundering safe haven for terrorists and
criminal organizations. Not least, untraceable funding to finance opposing factions in the shadow
will continue to undermine the ability of the US to leverage economic, legal ways/means
efficiently.
Law
[Explanatory variable:]

In the post-Ghaddafi, the lack of a centralized judicial authority resulted in the
decentralization of the rule law, delegated to local militias and communities.

[Causal mechanism:]

The political fragmentation in the Eastern and Western factions did not
enable the unified stability needed to pursue a centralized authority responsible for
the rule of law management in the country.
The result was localized law management with no Libyan institutional
oversight. Despite UN/UNSMIL appeals to compel the rule of law, the absence of a
recognized authority enabled widespread instances of human rights violations and
abuses, especially on migrants.
The lawful void prompted the enaction of partisan laws to advance parochial
interests (e.g., the ‘lustration law’).
Such abuse amidst the corruption of the existing judicial system and officials
made it impossible to resolve any form of internal disputes.

[Outcome, as of
March 2021:]

Continuing abuses on migrants, civilians, migrant workers aggravated the
humanitarian crises in Libya.
The judicial apparatus remains partially functional amidst armed groups who continue
perpetrating human rights violations and abuses of local power to intimidate, harass,
threaten, physically attack, and arbitrarily detain political activists, migrants, and
displaced personnel.

What may continue to go wrong? First, Libya's prolonged fragmentation of power and
political divisions will likely benefit terrorists, criminals, and armed groups bent on criminality.
This has created an environment of lawlessness, intimidation, and fear in which ordinary Libyans
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continue to suffer the lack of the centralized rule of law authority and justice oversight (Human
Rights Watch, 2021). Second, ensuring fair application and strict enforcement mechanisms of the
rule of law are requirements to tackle corruption effectively. Reportedly, perceptions of
international staff and investors questioned confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and
in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as
well as the likelihood of crime and violence (Global Economy, 2021). Third, nonnegligible is the
debate regarding how Islam will be treated as a state religion and a source of law. In the event
that Islam will be the source of law, what will the constitution say about how Islam fits within
any other sources of law, and which will take precedence?
Development
[Explanatory variable:]

In the immediate aftermath of the post-Ghaddafi, the conflict further fragmented the
country, leading to clashes for controlling and managing state infrastructures such as
power plants, water systems, and oil facilities.

[Causal mechanism:]

This impacted Libyan institutions' capacity to design, develop and implement
social policies and strengthen social-service delivery systems across all public sectors.
Available budget and funds were channeled to finance primarily militias and
armed groups and used for corrupt politicians, thus incentivizing affiliation to factionsin-war and fueling war-minded use of national revenues.
The resulting conflict, yet low-intense, led to disruption/threat of disruption
of critical infrastructures, oil, electricity, and water facilities.
The lack of resources resulted in unsustainable educational, healthcare, labor
investments, thus further aggravating the welfare of local communities, increasingly
prey of terrorists and militias.
Corruption discouraged foreign investments in Libya, and third-party
interferences disincentivized trust of local communities in Western foreign countries
support, to the detriment of US/UN/EU policies effectiveness.
The oil facilities became preferred targets of competing militias, causing oil
production sites to shut down and blockades that deprived institutions of oil revenues
to reinvest in local projects amidst the rampage of the COVID-19 pandemic outbreaks
among most vulnerable communities.

[Outcome, as of
March 2021:]

As part of the 2020 UN commitment to LPDF success, UN social/humanitarian
efforts and investments intensify to support the GNU transitioning responsibility to
elections and constitution approval.
Amidst the severe negative impact on social-service delivery systems of the protracted
conflict and the COVID-19 pandemic, the UN endeavored to strengthen the education
and healthcare systems and grant access to quality basic services for all people in Libya
across health, protection service, food, and nutrition sectors.
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What may continue to go wrong? First, despite the powered effort of UN assistance, the
infrastructure management network is highly likely to continue suffering the endemic corruption
within the institutional Libyan Investment Authority. Second, as a consequence, international
assistance programs are likely to struggle in supporting scaled social/developmental initiatives to
improve existing living conditions. Amid such efforts, the US Agency for International
Development (USAID) approach in Libya grapples with promoting development assistance to
help communities address drivers of instability and conflict. The goal is to strengthen
representative political processes, improve the business environment, expand employment
opportunities, and maximize government capacity to deliver essential services (U.S. Agency for
International Development [USAID], 2021). Nonetheless, developmental challenges hold the
potential to turn into opportunities for the US. By leveraging its instruments of power to
strengthen its ties and relationships with Libyan institutions and authorities favorably, the US
will likely enhance its oversight on adversarial attempts to grow its influence in the broader
MENA through increased control and power in Libya.
Implications on the US National Security, a Deeper Look: Patterns and Scenarios
The sections above contributed to confirming and proving how the pre-identified major
driving forces of the crisis conjoined indeed as causal mechanisms and drove negative outcomes
for US national security interests in Libya. The analysis describes a scenario that seems unlikely
to be resolved despite the thesis’s claimed renovated US engagement in Libya. It can be argued
that due to the complexities and dynamics of the Libyan chaos, no state actors would benefit
favorably from the country's instability, downsizing the potential harmful pitfalls for the US
national security interests. This next section does a deeper, richer explanation of the implications
speculated from the formal findings in the process tracing and the identified causal mechanisms.
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Libya presents warning signs concerning US national security priorities that include the
threat of terrorism, the presence and influence of all major US adversaries (i.e., Russia, China,
Iran), dangers to oil-based economies, an indirect threat to Israel security, all amidst GPC
dynamics and realities that ultimately aim at eroding US competitive advantage in the
Mediterranean and MENA, two strategic regions in which upholding US dominance would be
itself a sufficient national security criticality. Although not exclusive, the internationalization of
the crisis is among the most impacting root causes of the protracted low-intensity conflict in
post-Ghaddafi Libya. There is a substantial misalignment among the perceived, unison
commitment of the international community institutionally identified in the UN/UNSMIL and
the real partisanship dynamics of foreign state actors involved in Libya.
Rival political factions are proxy-driven by foreign interests and strategies. Such
dynamics prompt to maintain the military apparatus fragmented and delocalized. The security
vacuum directly contributes to enabling terrorist presence, foreign state actors’ interference, and
lawlessness status quo. Moreover, any attempt at reconciliation among rival factions is covertly
and routinely sabotaged by proxy interference of foreign state actors through local militias. UNbrokered political dialogues lack inclusiveness and fair representation of less influential Libyan
communities, especially from the South.
Access to oil/gas production sites’ management and the sector revenues are the root
causes of the continuing re-emergence of clashes and conflicts in the county between rival
political factions, militias, terrorists vs. militias, within-UN members competing interests and
interference. In addition, economic and developmental state-funded or international-financed
projects for aid and assistance are victims of the endemic corruption of Libyan authorities and
officials.
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The analysis developed in the previous sections offered a comprehensive assessment of
the causal mechanisms and patterns that led to the instability status quo of the crisis inherited by
GNU. In the aftermath of the GNU appointment, US Ambassador to the UN stated the US
priorities in Libya as “unity, transparency, and free and fair elections.” This requires active US
engagement in Libya, including leading coordination of EU allies' efforts and ensuring the
continued focus and unity of effort (Collige et Impera-minded) of foreign actors involved in
Libya in adherence to UN-issued noninterference, an arms embargo, and ceasefire. The
continuation of the crisis in the case of absence or partial involvement of the US will be
detrimental for its national security interests, potentially prompting the scenarios below.
Russia: Mediterranean watchdog and African loose cannon. Russia steadily increased its
footprint across Libya, whose nature and scope of its activities have three significant
implications for US national security, threatening its capacity to preserve its interests in the
broader MENA. First, Russia's support for the Kremlin-proxy Wagner Group in Libya
demonstrates a willingness to use private military companies in direct defiance of UN resolutions
(e.g., anti-corruption, the arms embargo), circumventing any potential accusation of violation.
Russian-disguised military ways and means as traditional offensives of economic and diplomatic
charm, with a geostrategic intent of exploiting the crisis in the country as a ‘Trojan horse’ for a
more expansive strategy in the MENA and sub-Saharan Africa more broadly. The aim appears to
be to erode US influence and destabilize US regional alliances. The influx of counterfeit,
Russian-printed Libyan currency shows a willingness to illicitly interfere with foreign economies
to overt their functionality and exploit their vulnerabilities to its own advantage. Alarmingly,
Russia proved able to create economic dependency in Libya, tying HoR/LNA in order to
presumably secure, as a trade-off, greater access/control to the country's rich reserves of oil and
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natural resources (Cragin & MacKenzie, 2020). More deeply still, this would provide Russia
with the possibility to increase pressure on the EU, which relies on Libyan oil and gas, and used
to bargain strategic access to the Mediterranean and Libyan coasts.
Second, Russia's recent escalation of its intervention in Libya demonstrates that Moscow
retains both the willingness and capability to intervene militarily beyond its immediate sphere of
influence in Eastern Europe in order to establish strategic footholds further afield. US
AFRICOM has repeatedly highlighted how Russia, through the Wagner Group, has positioned
military equipment in Libya capable of conducting kinetic operations beyond the Libyan conflict
(U.S. Africa Command [US AFRICOM], 2020). This proves an intent toward sustained
offensive combat action capabilities, a major security threat for NATO along the southern flank
in North Africa. Wagner Group activities in Africa do not pose a direct threat to US national
security interests, and there is currently a little risk of clashes between the US and mercenary
forces (as occurred in Syria). Nevertheless, the transfer of weapons and personnel is a bold move
by Moscow. Accordingly, the US should continue to designate and sanction front companies and
individuals that support the Wagner Group's malign activities as it pursues a negotiated
settlement to Libya's crisis.
Third, no less concerning, the increased Russian presence in Libya empowers a growing
Iranian involvement in the country that might challenge regional stability. The US-sponsored
Abraham Accords among Israel and UAE fueled division among North African countries. If
Morocco has welcomed a renovated Israeli reconciliation, Algeria has sided with pro-Eastern
(Russia and China) axis, opening to boosted ties with Moscow and Bejing (Mezran & Pavia,
2021). Increased Russia influence may trigger inversion of the existing pro-US favorable
affiliation in Tunisia and Egypt, also permeating Libya and thus creating a Russian alignment of
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Mediterranean countries pressuring the security stability of EU-NATO countries. It cannot be
ruled out the possibility that a wider Russian presence could exploit migrant crises to impose
instrumental cooperation from EU members to its strategic advantage. A pro-Iranian Russian
posture and narrative would also likely result in a reaction of Israel itself and Saudi Arabia,
decidedly non-prone to accept any strategic advantage to Iran.
China resiliency. China's influence in the MENA in the areas of trade, investment, and
infrastructure projects is expanding in ways that give China far more potential (military) leverage
to link its interests to an expanded new role in the region, to the detriment of the US. For
example, Sino-Russian economic policies in Libya converge, with China backing the Kremlin's
sympathy for the LNA forces (Semenov, 2020). At the same time, China also maintained a
fruitful relationship with GNA, seeking a strategic non-alignment that allows greater crosspartisan acceptance to advance its interests (Burton, 2021). This has allowed China to increase,
for instance, the volume of trafficking operations in and from the country, exploiting existing
smuggling routes, using Libya as a source, destination, and transit point for counterfeit goods
towards the EU markets (KnowYourCountry, 2019).
Furthermore, China is highly likely to develop relationships with North African countries
and incorporate them in the Belt and Road Initiative. The project has driven China's overseas
energy security strategy and investments, and China sees an opportunity to access Libya's oil and
gas resources (Chaziza, 2020). It cannot be ruled out that China may become more politically
assertive by moving from a less-interventionist, business-centered policy to a more decisive
presence to protect its growing economic interests in the region (Chen, 2020). GPC realities have
transformed check and balances dynamics: China's direct access to Libyan oil, in the
medium/long term, will likely reduce the flow towards EU countries, exasperating a delicate
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energy balance that will position Russia and China in a position of advantage with EU.
Worryingly from the US national security priority to protect Israel in the MENA, Chinese
foreign minister Wang recently made it also clear that "China firmly supports Iran in
safeguarding its state sovereignty and national dignity" (Cordesman, 2021). The China-Iran
agreement could represent a severe game-changer in the MENA scenario for the US due to the
latter's hegemonic regional ambitions combined with the former's economic potentials (Saikal,
2021).
Libya, a chessboard for an Iranian game. We have already noted that China and Russia
have backed Iran’s stance and role in the MENA, and this may empower Iran to advance its
ambitious hegemonic strategy further, testing the holding of existing pro-US alliances in Libya.
Iran made clear it does not consider the GNA an interlocutor in Libya since it is considered a
political derivative of the US. This was used as a justification to side with the Arab-‘moderate’,
non-Islamic LNA – which involved the alleged provision of advanced Iranian-manufactured
ballistic missile systems on Libyan soil (Yuruk, 2020). Aside from being a grave violation of the
UN arms embargo, this has major implications on US national security priority to protect its
homeland given the closer geographical proximity, not to mention the direct impact on Israel
security.
Iran increased involvement in Libya holds threatening implications for further
destabilization of intra-NATO relationships. Iran has already voiced opposition against Turkey's
expansion in Libya, invoking the inefficiency of an uncoordinated NATO divisive policy in the
country. While some analysts are skeptical about Iran-LNA alignment, it is more prudent and
credible to assume that Tehran will not oppose its primary and long-standing allies in Libya, the
Assad regime, which backed Haftar, and Russia (Bakeer, 2020). Therefore, it is reasonable to

60

assume that all these actors see Libya as a venue for achieving a common anti-Turkey goal,
regardless of their divergent background ("The New Arab," 2020). Finally, there is a concern
about nuclear capacity's potential (but not yet a direct threat). Libya suspended its nuclear
program during the Ghaddafi regime but potentially had the facilities to host the Iranian arsenal.
Since Iran's (illicit) proximity to nuclear weapons capabilities (Brewer, 2021), it is not
unthinkable that assembly and storage could take place at a distance, for instance, in Libya. This
would allow Iran to evade the monitoring of the international community if negotiations to
revive the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (nuclear deal with Iran) would fail.
Turkey and its new-Ottoman ambitions. Seeking a more independent foreign policy from
US and NATO, Turkey has used Libya as a steppingstone to strengthen its strategy of developing
a leading role in the broader MENA (Cook, 2021, p. 21). In order to advance its geopolitical
agenda in the region, Ankara instrumentalizes its sway over and proximity to Islamist networks
in Arab countries like Libya. As a result, Turkey pursued bilateral military agreements with
Libya independently from NATO coordination (Harchaoui, 2020). However, despite the
modicum of restraint shown by Turkey, its proclivity for hard power and obstinate determination
to maintain a permanent military mission may compromise US/UN-vouched political objectives
of Libya stabilization. Moreover, by establishing a presence in northwest Libya, Ankara
gradually gains access to the Sahel and other parts of sub-Saharan Africa, specifically Sudan and
the Horn of Africa. Indeed, the importance of the African market for Turkey's construction
companies and export-oriented manufacturers is nonnegligible.
Turkey's intervention in Libya underscores Ankara's destabilizing ambitions to stymie
peaceful energy development by US partners such as Israel and other Mediterranean powers, EU
members included. The Libyan conflict offered Turkey a golden opportunity to alter the eastern
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Mediterranean oil and gas dynamics. In this regard, the 2019 maritime agreement with Tripoli
that established an exclusive economic zone jeopardizes future efforts to deliver these resources
to Europe. This undermines the reduction of dependence on Russian energy imports, a goal
shared by the United States and NATO-EU members (The Jewish Institute for National Security
of America [JINSA], 2020, p. 18). Not least, a more expansive, legitimate presence of Turkey in
the Mediterranean would raise tension with Greece over maritime sovereignty/boundary
disputes.
Terrorist and transnational criminal global (in)security operation center. The US
withdrawal from Afghanistan cannot be decontextualized from the development of terrorist
groups in Libya. Given the specter of AQ resurgence associated with the return of the Taliban in
Afghanistan, there is a potential for a resurrection of the global terrorist movement, which has a
major hub in Libya. The biggest danger of a reinvigorated effort of Jihadists is in poor, unstable
states where terrorists already control territory (The Economist, 2021): Libya provides a perfect
environment. As pointed out in the process tracing section, Libya has been elected and used by
the major FTOs active in the MENA and Africa as the ideal regional hub. The same strategic
value that the country holds for the US as a crossroads between the Mediterranean, the Middle
East, and North Africa also holds for terrorists. The territorial extension of the country's southern
region, the Fezzan, suffers borders porosity that enables and facilitates the transit of foreign
fighters, equipment, weapons, and drugs for smuggling and trafficking purposes (International
Crisis Group, 2017). Illicit trade routes that link Libya with Syria and Iraq in the MENA, and
Chad, Niger, Sudan, and the Horn of Africa in Africa are exploited by terrorists to sustain their
affiliates and campaigns regionally.
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Libya risks becoming a money laundering safe haven for terrorists, undermining the
sustainability of the GWoT and the efficiency of financial tools to detect and freeze terrorist
assets and resources. The corrupted currency control regime and lack of access to foreign
currency have severely increased money laundering risks in Libya. As a result, terrorists
exploited vulnerabilities of the weak bank and financial systems to profit their revenues and
reinvest in illicit forms of credit. In 2019, the European Commission assessed Libya's strategic
deficiencies regarding anti-money laundering and terrorist financing practices, placing the
country in its anti-money laundering watchlist (European Commission, 2019). Since Libya's
markets continue to be dominated by cash transactions in a lack-of-currency status of the
banking system, the black market for currency trading has grown worrisomely, fueling and
facilitating money laundering practices from terrorists and criminal organizations (United
Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute [UNICRI], 2021, p. 17).
According to the same EU report, Libya lacks commitment to implementing
internationally agreed standards in fighting illicit financial flows, namely those revenues,
proceeds, and any other assets generated by corruption (e.g., embezzlement of national wealth by
government officials), illicit commerce (e.g., tax evasion, misrepresentation, money laundering
through commercial transactions), and criminal activities (e.g., human and drug trafficking,
smuggling, counterfeiting, and terrorist financing). Such weaknesses favor terrorists and their
covert financers, allowing circumventing the internationally adopted sanctions against corruption
and money laundering violations.
The big picture. Libya bandwagoning drift. It is of strategic, national security relevance
and interest for the US to prevent Libya from falling into bandwagoning drift outside of the US
sphere of influence to turn to its adversaries, Russia and China especially. The context of the
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crisis witnessed US foes and allies alarmingly attempting to more robustly share with the US as a
key security provider of reference for Libyan authorities. Increasing fragmentation of power over
time in Libya also stemmed from the US's limited commitment to providing a coherent response
to the country-wide, endemic threat of Islamic extremism. FTOs exploit the security vacuum to
establish a foothold nationwide (Chivvis & Martini, 2014, Chapter 1). Security implications
extend to the challenges of migration from Africa to the EU. Libya is the preferred route used by
transnational criminal organizations and FTOs for human trafficking and weapon smuggling.
There will not be sustainable reunification without establishing a security framework led by
Libyans. Thus, the US role of adviser, mentor, provider of CT resources, and capacities to
implant a self-sufficient, autonomous security system is a strategic opportunity. Besides, CT
effectiveness is critical to neutralize FTOs' access to oil selling revenue to finance their terror
strategies.
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Section 4
What Can Be Done: a Normative Discussion
The identified driving forces at the root of the protracted instability detailed above
inspired some thinking and suggestions on how the US should invest its reengagement in Libya.
This normative inquiry stemmed from the uncertainties and complexities that characterized the
interdependence of those driving forces in the crisis. The following discussion frames tentative
approaches aimed at suggesting solutions to untangle the complex Libyan reality. Such
ambitious thinking is based on the observed findings and patterns gained from the first macro
methodological step of the analysis. It helped mature a more insightful understanding of the
prolonged Libyan instability, questioning the decade-long inadequacy of US engagement and
exploring realities that can turn into direct threats to US national security. Kissinger's rationale,
used to frame the US foreign policy approach in the Middle East during the 1970s and 1980s,
seems to fit the argument of the justification for today's US reengagement in Libya. Kissinger
argued that for the order and stability to be sustainable in the Middle East, it had to be
legitimated, meaning that all major powers had to adhere to a commonly accepted set of rules
(Indyk, 2021, p. 155).
In the case of Libya, the prerequisite for aiming at order and stability is a collective
legitimization of a set of commonly accepted, promoted, and supervised UN rules (e.g., the arms
embargo, respect for anti-corruption, and non-interference). However, as the sections above have
suggested, because few US foes and allies will comport themselves according to US values and
UN regulatory proposals, it seems these rules will not be followed absent US reengagement. By
reengaging constructively with Libya, maximizing the potentials of its instruments of national
power, and working with all foreign powers to commit in a unity of effort (Collige) process, the
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US would likely buy time to stabilize Libya and lessen impacts on the MENA order. This should
at least preserve the US competitive advantage as per its national security interests and avoid the
fall into a more dangerous disorder fueled by the further internationalization of the crisis amidst
GPC dynamics.
The absence of US diplomatic leadership in giving concrete follow-up UN initiatives on
the ground with its resources, means, and coordinating authority left unchecked the scale and
depth of involvement of foreign actors in Libya. The relocation of the US embassy out of Libya
to Tunisia partly undermined EU and UN diplomatic initiatives. It showed the limits of
international assistance in the event of a US detachment from a collective effort. This proved that
the US is uniquely positioned as a credible arbiter in the international arena and that its
involvement in Libya is key to a sustainable solution (JINSA, 2020, p. 19).
Given the complexity and deep forces we have identified above, an all-front US
reengagement would lack feasibility. The US should act intelligently and sustainably with the
wariness of aiming too high (and avoiding overreaching in Libya) while considering the danger
of aiming too low (meaning remaining scarcely involved in the country given the regional and
global implications of such absence). Therefore, the US should leverage its instruments of power
in Libya to address three macro areas of instability, namely security, economy, and the rule of
law, supportive to a Libya sustainable and functional recovery from chaos while fulfilling its
national security interests and priorities.
More precisely, US focus and efforts should straiten on enabling – thus enhancing –
border security, tackling corruption to sustain the legal economy, and implanting a functional
judicial system architecture. However ambitious, the aforementioned options for reengagement
stemmed from the potentials of the US in leading the international system purposefully by
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leveraging its instruments of national power meaningfully. Noteworthy, as a caveat, the election
outcomes in December 2021 may escalate or de-escalate the existing (un)balance, impacting the
viability and sustainability of the following discussions.
The ‘Collige et Impera’ Rationale from Within
The US should promote and enable the creation of a representative security apparatus
focused on border security by capitalizing on the Libyan sense of national belonging backed by
the US assets and system of alliances. This rationale stems from two considerations: first, border
security has to be a Libyan choice; second, it has to be actionable and manageable by Libyans.
Only if the US shepherds Libya’s armed formations to unite (Collige) from within can there be a
sustainable solution favorable to its national security interests. Since Libyans would hardly
accept an imposed security priority from an outsider, regardless of the US authoritative
reputation among Libyans (Townsend & McKenzie, 2021), Libyan armed formations should
elect border security as their choice so as to fulfill the rationale 'in a Libyan-owned and Libyanled security framework.' This would require the US to constructively address the security
discourse with Libyan authorities in terms of priority and measurable outcomes, helping to shape
a road map that would enable Libyans to pursue aspired sovereignty over their land. As per such
logic, border security would fit the purpose. Furthermore, the US should intelligently leverage
Libyan national pride to bind the efforts of diverse armed formations to ideally devote lasting
cooperation. This would contribute to a cooperative coexistence and hopefully lead Libyans to
acknowledge that enabling borders control could enhance their own people's security, hence
capitalizing on the binding national pride and sense of responsibility.
The US should reassure Libyan authorities of the feasibility of refocusing security
priority on border security by ensuring confidence-building in foreign interference
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disengagement and implementation of a ceasefire. While serving its assets and alliances to
provide training and effective democratic governance of the security sector, the US should also
pressure Russia and Turkey robustly via UN intercession. The diplomatic goal should be a
phased, responsible redeployment and eventual withdrawal of their forces in a way that would
not trigger renewed fighting by Libyans (Wehrey, 2021). Ironically, this, in turn, would set the
stage for the US to persuade Libyan authorities to request the support of an international force to
assist with border security tasks. Ideally, this would prompt a Libyan authorization to deploy USsponsored forces (e.g., NATO-based, mainly EU-provided) under a UN mandate for exclusive
border security assistance and training tasks and functions. Libyan armed formations cannot
meet the numbers in terms of ground force for efficiently performing border control. Although
they count on a wide territorial presence, the extension of the Libyan borders reasonably requires
enhanced support and resources that armed groups do not possess and cannot provide. It can be
argued that Libyan authorities have repeatedly proved against foreign ‘boots on the ground’ in
post-Ghaddafi Libya, allowing only a NATO light military footprint (Saini Fasanotti, 2021).
However, the US contribution to framing a shared vision and guidance in advancing a proLibyans and Libyan-owned security commitment could open space for this initiative.
Furthermore, DOD may make satellite imagery of weapons embargo violations across
borders available to Libyan authorities, underscoring how border security should become pivotal
in their own interests. This would build on the momentum created by US AFRICOM, which
exposed Russian military aircraft stationed in eastern Libya and called into question Russia's
denials of its support for Haftar (Townsend & McKenzie, 2021). The US would then be entitled
to implement AFRICOM resources, expertise, relationships, and capabilities in Libya, not least
in the form of embedded liaisons, staffing, advisors, and mentorship to sustain a security force
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assistance initiative focused on border security enhancement. The US could commit its Europe
and Africa naval forces, devoting assets of the sixth fleet in the Mediterranean to patrol Libyan
waters, discouraging any attempt to infringe UN regulatory dispositions and illicit trafficking of
migrants. This would ideally convince EU members of NATO to get involved in a coordinated
yet multilateral and unified way, thus reinvigorating a NATO-minded joint collaboration
between Washington and Brussels to avert the partition of Libya. The collective support of
international institutions would also be ideal because Libyans may be skeptical if the coalition
consists of only a few countries, entitling them to assume the usual fragmentary epilogues
motivated by non-Libyan, parochial interests. In 2012, the US DOD and DOS raised national
security concerns about Libya's unrealistic challenges to control its land, air, and maritime
borders with limited trained forces (Castelli, 2012, p. 13). Both departments proposed a joint
effort to assist, train, and advise a Libyan security force to face border security-related
vulnerabilities. However, the focus remained on a remote-type warfare idea inspired by the
GWoT that limited military involvement to special forces and UAV kinetic operations, leaving
the security force assistance/building project aside. Successfully enhancing Libyan security via
border security would reduce the permeability to terrorists or the exploitation of trans-regional
smuggling (human, drugs, weapons) routes, favorably addressing the US and EU-minded
Mediterranean security priorities. Enhanced perceived security could also prompt Libyan
authorities from disengaging the regional and foreign dependency for security assistance, like
UAE, Turkey, Qatar, Russia, and Egypt.
Achieving tangible border security-type of success in the short term may incentivize
diverse Libyan militias to remain embarked on a collective, unified effort as responsible
providers of their own people security. The reduction of illicit cross-border migrations, rejection
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of terrorist foreign fighters at the border, the re-routing of weapons smuggling routes outside
Libya would prove functional to this argument. Acceptance of NATO as an institutional
interlocutor for assistance would either accomplish the goal of training a Libyan professional
border security force and also legitimately reroute in a shared commitment the disconnected
initiatives of NATO members like Turkey, France, and Italy (Jacobs, 2021).
The misaligned military presence of NATO countries would then be realigned to a
NATO-overseen security force assistance initiative to support border security goals. This would
actively pressure Russian to rethink its proxy military strategy in Libya and North Africa, with
its mercenaries already reported in Chad and Sudan (Usta, 2021). At the same time, US
policymakers should recognize that private military companies are likely to be a long-term
policy tool for Russia and consider establishing and clarifying redlines for Russian government
material transfers to and political support for Wagner Group activities. A further threat to US
national security is also represented by the complementary cyber warfare efforts Russia could
empower in the Mediterranean and MENA, ranging from anti-US/NATO propaganda to
disinformation. Building on the LPDF agreement, the US DoT could also limit Russia's influence
by sanctioning individuals, groups, and entities found to be involved in the repeated transfer of
weapons and mercenaries to Libya (Alaaldin & Badi, 2020). This would allegedly strengthen the
EU’s maritime Operation Irini, designed to oversee Libya’s arms embargo (International Crisis
Group, 2021), by allowing its naval assets to specifically target vessels associated with
sanctioned entities.
If accepted by the majority of armed groups, with effective centralized coordination
backed by US alliances, the collective commitment to enhance Libyan border security might
shift the focus from politically-fueled proxy civil conflict. Ideally, this would also foster a fair

70

representation and inclusiveness of all armed formations from western, eastern, and southern
regions. One could argue that existing grievances and differences (religious, ideological,
political) will remain, rejecting the feasibility of the cooperation discourse (Wehrey, 2021).
However, it can be claimed that domestic discord has been more instrumentally leveraged from
foreign patronage networks rather than fueled from within by Libyans (Reid, 2020). In this
regard, the growing presence of mercenaries in the country is unwelcomed, stemming more from
vulnerabilities caused by corrupted security management than from a Libyan demand for
augmented forces (Cherkaoui, 2021). More broadly, the US should develop a comprehensive
strategy to disincentivize African countries from entertaining partnerships with private military
companies like the Russian Wagner Group. Economic and military tradeoffs with external
powers in exchange for financial aid and equipment aggravates the delicate balance between
security assistance and interference fueled by endemic corruption among Libyan authorities.
A New Paradigm: GWoC, the Global War on Corruption
The US should empower the Libyan efforts to fight corruption in the public sector by
minimizing its exposure to war economy dynamics in managing the oil sector and its revenues.
According to Transparency International Corruption Perception Index, Libya continues to rank
among the most corrupt countries in the world (Transparency International, 2021). Among the
primary vulnerabilities that fuel corruption is the large Libyan public administration, which
performs poorly on governance, transparency, and management of economy-related sectors. In
the public sector, nepotism and favoritism are two major issues afflicting post-Ghaddafi Libyan
institutional authorities, hampering the implementation of anti-corruption programs (UNICRI,
2021). This is aggravated by active or passive bribery of domestic or foreign public officials,
including staff of international organizations, the obstruction of justice, the active and passive
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trading in influence, the abuse of functions, and illicit enrichment often financed by outside
actors. Hence, public officials use this patronage system to expand the circle of people who rely
on them for jobs and a living, thereby systematizing corruption based upon clientelism.
Therefore, the US should contribute with technical assistance, formation, and oversight to
empower UN-led initiatives to emplace anti-corruption standards, develop systematic training
and enhance regulatory oversight. As a matter of fact, Libya suffers the constraint of lacking
professionals in the public sector who are adequately competent and skilled in investigating
corruption cases. Even fewer are knowledgeable in asset tracing, freezing, seizure, confiscation,
and recovery (UNICRI, 2021).
The US should encourage Libyan authorities to streamline the existing plethora of coparticipated institutional bodies deputed to anti-corruption by empowering Libya’s National
Anti-Money Laundering Commission (Zaptia, 2020) as the only dedicated directorate competent
in this matter. At present, Libya counts ten institutions responsible for corruption overwatch,
including the National Anti-Corruption Commission, several ministries, and bureaus (UNICRI,
2021, par. 3.1). The abundance creates redundancy, which leads to overlap of competencies that
result in the inefficiency of already poorly-developed control policies posing significant
coordination challenges to the effective investigation and prosecution (as well as the prevention)
of corruption. Compliance with Libyan-led anti-corruption efforts should also require
responsible cooperation from the international community in committing to a global war on
corruption in Libya. Whereas the US is actively engaging with the Governor of the Central Bank
of Libya to discuss sustainable and actionable procedures for probing corruption in the country,
such effort should count on multilateral and collective compliance. Since corruption leaves the
door wide open for illicit financial flows, in turn generating practices used by the majority of
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foreign powers to fuel the conflict for proxy interests, the US should pressure allies as well as
competitors – if necessary under the threat of intensifying current sanctions - to pause their
under-the-radar, financial-leveraged interference.
The US should also promote the appointment of a centralized coordination authority
inclusive of Libyans and UN advisers to enable the convergence between the oil ministry
policies and the NOC. The poor anti-corruption performance of public institutions and revenue
governance in Libya inherently feeds corruption in the oil sector, attracting domestic and foreign
interests. In Libya, oil revenues fund a moderate social safety net (United Nations Development
Programme, 2021) but also two sizeable inefficient public and security sectors dubbed the
country's most corrupt. Oil revenue overdependence has negative consequences for Libya's
governance system and increases the risk of corruption. Moreover, oil prices are volatile, making
proper financial management and planning difficult for the central government, vulnerable to
detrimental, increased corruption during the oil market crises, strictly dependent upon global
security trends such as the ongoing Covid-19 pandemic. The Central Bank of Libya controls
these funds and disburses them throughout the country. Currently, there are insufficient legal and
regulatory mechanisms, with a lack of transparency and fairness about how state funds are used.
Notably, a successful, US-brokered refocus of armed groups' efforts on border security
could help disjoint the corruption mechanisms leveraged to interfere in the management of oil
sites protection. Noteworthy, this would be a beneficial enabler for the recent UN-sponsored
agreement to create a joint force of civilians and military under the command of the NOC to
protect the facilities (Peoples Dispatch, 2020). Links between armed groups and Libyan
politicians, often regulated by corruption dynamics (payments in exchange for favors), have
routinely been exploited to target the oil sector in order to exert influence over politics/power-
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minded government affairs (Badi, 2021). Clashes between armed groups and the petroleum
facilities guard (Libyan company and militia responsible for the security of Libyan oil
production sites) have been recurrent. Since 2014, LNA-affiliated factions have often targeted
oilfields terminals to pressure GNA rivals, resulting in many shutdowns and blockades that
paralyzed the country's economy (Aljazeera, 2020). By shifting the effort of armed groups on
border security as suggested above (while physically moving them from the hot spots of fights),
the US could help disjoint the trend to leverage local armed formations to target oil facilities.
Continued corruption and impunity risk alienating ordinary Libyans from the ruling authorities,
undermining the trust-building that GNU desperately needs. Notably, Libya remains harmfully
vulnerable to money laundering because it has one of the highest criminality scores in Africa,
with the highest score in North Africa as of 2019 (ENACT, 2019, para. 4.3.1).
The Rule of Law, Backbone for Libya
The US should help instill in the social texture a sense of compliance to the rule of law by
tackling criminal practices (e.g., human trafficking, money laundering, weapons, and drugs
smuggling), thus shaping a functional judicial system enabling development and social reforms.
Alongside an actionable and sustainable security initiative to pursue a viable security architecture
and empowered assistance in tackling corruption, the US should help enforce accountability in
compliance with the rule of law. In Libya, accountability and justice have been sacrificed in the
name of peace and stability – promised but never achieved. All parties to the conflict must
remove those reasonably suspected of war crimes and human rights abuses from their ranks and
fully cooperate with the UN/UNSMIL efforts (Amnesty International, 2021). Instead, impunity
has become the new normality in the judicial system, and violators of the rule of law have often
been integrated into state institutions. Such dynamics implicitly fueled the proliferation of
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criminal gangs and organizations' affiliates increasingly involved in those illicit markets more
prone to exploitation meaning human trafficking and weapons, drugs smuggling. Besides
benefitting local ‘warlords’ and major political rival formations, lawlessness incentivized
terrorists to expand their footprint in Libya, elected as a regional hub for coordinating operations
in the Middle East and beyond.
The US should work closely with Libyan authorities and UN staffing to enhance
interagency cooperation in the justice sector by adopting the UNSMIL roadmap for transitional
justice and ensuring access to justice for all Libyans, establishing legal aid and assistance
services. The former, since 2012, has established a fact-finding and reconciliation commission to
investigate human rights violations and provide reparations for victims. The latter has struggled
to enable understanding of legal rights among Libyans and strengthen timely and affordable
justice through a national legal aid system that supports marginalized groups in attaining legal
counseling and representation (United Nations Human Rights Council, 2014).
To achieve and maintain a safe and secure environment, all citizens and institutions must
adhere to fairly applied laws and adjudicate independently. Libyans sought justice through nonstate means during recent conflicts and clashes via armed groups' self-regulatory law principles,
often derived from tribal and Islamist-minded legacies (Ihya Libya, 2021). Extrajudicial means
of resolving disputes are being used because of the failure of existing legal structures to protect
the Libyan people and a lack of trust in the justice system. The authorities' prolonged inability to
reform legal structures and apprehend and prosecute suspected criminals has exacerbated
Libyans' lack of trust in the judicial system and increased their reliance on non-state actors for
security and dispute resolution.
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The US should exert pressure to restart the judicial reform process, which stalled in 2014
as the country's security deteriorated with the rise of LNA and the fight for power. Currently, the
judicial system is barely functional and faces grave threats from armed actors and an increasingly
ambiguous judicial and legal framework. Apart from the militias' influence on the conventional
judicial system, the International Crisis Group has described a parallel judicial system in which
"independent armed groups assumed state functions, arresting, detaining, and kidnapping
individuals without judicial oversight or accountability" (International Crisis Group, 2013, p.
18). The use of detention centers outside the legal framework by non-state armed actors poses a
unique challenge for the Libyan justice system. Torture and ill-treatment have also been widely
documented, including within the human and migrants trafficking crises (International
Commission of Jurists, 2016).
Because armed formations assumed the roles of police, prosecutors, judges, and jailers,
post-Ghaddafi Libya witnessed an uncontrollable surge in crime rates and spread of illicit
activities. This triggered a vicious cycle: frustration with the pace of justice and widespread
mistrust embolden armed groups; their increased activism undermines the state's ability to
function, including on issues of law and order; and this, in turn, vindicates the armed groups'
claim that it is their responsibility to fill the vacuum. What is required is the authoritative support
of the US and US-minded international institutions to enable, support, and resource a more
comprehensive transitional justice process that includes, in addition to criminal prosecutions,
appropriate mechanisms for vetting former regime loyalists and truth commissions.
Simultaneously, armed groups, including those still hailed as uprising heroes of the 2011
revolution that toppled the Ghaddafi regime, must also be held publicly accountable for their
actions (Chatham House, 2020, Chapter 1). This would allegedly help regain trust from the
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people while providing committed, fair, transparent assistance from the international community
led by a US-brokered effort for Libya.
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Section 5
Conclusion
This project approached the strategic analysis of post-Ghaddafi Libya from a US national
security perspective through applying the MIDFIELD taxonomy. This helped to systematically
breakdown very complex events and focus on their impact on US interests. The research
depicted a reality in which the disorder and the rhetoric of Divide et Impera have exacerbated the
vulnerabilities of Libya, creating a deeply insecure political, security, and economic stalemate.
The thesis addressed the Libyan crisis as a Mediterranean security priority in which the
preservation of US national security priorities is at stake. Among these, it identified the
(in)efficiency of GWoT efforts, the (un)sustainability of the relationships with EU allies and
within the NATO alliance, the dangerous erosion of US dominance, role, and influence in the
MENA at the hands of competing GPC actors and strategies.
The thesis revealed and explored driving forces that the US should sustainably address to
reengage Libya constructively while preserving its national security interests in the broader
MENA and Mediterranean. Altogether, they formed the baseline for building a purposeful
normative discussion supporting reengagement amidst complexities and intertwined competing
proxy warfare interests. Unfortunately, much of this chaos stems from the US's initial decision
not to engage fully, the withdrawal of even the few remaining on-the-ground resources and
diplomatic presence, and a subsequent reduction in commitment to Libya in conjunction with the
absence of effective EU and UN engagement in lieu of a dedicated proxy competition fueled by
external actors.
The thesis questioned the apparent secondary role of Libya in the US foreign policy
agenda. The Biden administration cannot reasonably repose much hope in the success of the
democratic elections in December 2021, given the observed failure of any government of
transition since 2011. If successful, results are far from being resolutive and could hardly seal a
definitive solution to Libya's stability and sovereignty (Wehrey, 2021). However, expectations of
success or otherwise, the US should not be unprepared to face a potential relapse into a political
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stalemate that would degenerate into further conflict, this time with even more damaging and
threatening potentials given the internationalization of the conflict status quo. Therefore, the US
renovated reengagement in Libya holds national security relevance justified in preserving and
maintaining its competitive advantage over its adversaries. This implies preserving the existing
US system of alliances while safeguarding security and stability in two geostrategic regions, the
MENA and the Mediterranean. Indeed, the US reengagement in Libya can serve as a model for
demonstrating that truly "America is back" in a ‘Collige et Impera’ approach based upon unity of
effort with EU/NATO allies in tackling a legit global security priority.
The Biden administration holds the opportunity to practically confirm the US responsible
role of shaper and main pillar of world security order. In the aftermath of the controversial
withdrawal from Afghanistan, a reinvigorated US reengagement in Libya would help restore
NATO's accountable centrality in international security. NATO has been blamed for abandoning
Libya following the 2011 intervention, contributing to post-conflict chaos (Fishman, 2021b).
However flawed such an assessment may be, partly because it ignores the complexities of
Libya's reality explored in this thesis, the US has a reasonable opportunity to reengage through
its alliances to assist in driving Libya's stabilization. Moreover, a strengthened NATO
commitment in Libya would obstruct Russia's alarming mercenary encroachment in Africa while
also preventing the harmful expansionism of terrorist groups, averting Libya from becoming a
regional MENA hub for terrorist training, recruitment, and sanctuary for protection.
A US-brokered NATO effort would primarily reunify the debunked individualist drifts of
its members like Turkey and France. Furthermore, an increased contribution of the US alongside
its EU/NATO partners in Libya would potentially stem the unresolved humanitarian security
issue of the migrants trafficking from Africa to the EU. The US would enable enhanced security
within and for Libya by addressing Libyan security vulnerabilities, proving and rightsizing its
global leadership targeted by discrediting allegations of GPC competitors. A sustainable
renovated US aid and assistance strategy in Libya, ranging from security mentorship to nationbuilding-aimed diplomacy, would favorably preserve the US interests in the MENA region,
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increasingly a stage of international interferences led by GPC priorities and strategies. Many of
these US actions hinge on the Biden administration's strategic willingness to make Libya more of
a foreign policy priority. Clearly, this does not imply that the US will own Libya. At the same
time, the thesis posed attention to how Libya cannot remain a US foreign policy sideshow
‘handled’ via an unsustainable remote warfare approach.
Limitations
The project accounts for practical limitations tied to the lack of direct engagement with
primary sources. The context of the thesis is complex per definition, being a foreign policy topic.
Interviews with US policymakers, DoS officers, UN/EU/NATO officials would have allowed
clarifying some of the complexities, dynamics, projects, efforts, policies for Libya, informing the
collection and analysis processes. Despite the large literature available, information filtered
through analysts' and authors' perspectives may entail underlying biases in judgments and
assessments. A first-hand perspective would have channeled normative inquiry into a viable, less
tentative discussion of what the US should and could do based upon realistic opportunities. This
might have included U.S. domestic politics and the (connected?) strategic shifts away from the
MENA and the “light footprint” or “remote warfare” approach to violent extremism and
terrorism (as opposed to deeper, more involved long-term approaches). In its normative section,
this thesis was deliberately ambitious, but these realities impinge on that ambition.
The historical exploration of the post-Ghaddafi Libyan crisis has stopped with the GNU
appointment in March 2021. Therefore, the analysis did not account for progress (if any) in
dealing with the political transition to the December elections, a key turning point to assess the
sustainability of normative considerations presented. Knowledgeable, expert insights on Libyan
cultural dynamics would have prompted deeper awareness of ongoing rivalries and domestic
(un)balance between local communities, militias, politicians. An aspect that the project did not
explore (it would have been a further layer of complexity added to the analysis) is the role of
tribalism and religion in Libya. The international community debate around the need to achieve
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Libya's sovereignty lacked contextualization with the sustainability of the democratic
architecture amidst a complex religious and tribal political framework.
Future Research
The thesis analysis, findings, and discussion also outline the ambitious potential for
future research that may unlock greater insights in several areas significant for national security
debates and, not least, options for a US sustainable reengagement in Libya. First, future research
should explore the need to adopt a standard systematic framework to break down strategic
analysis and forecasting. The breadth and depth of the engagement with the existing literature
noted the use of different conceptual tools such as DIME, PMESII, PMESII-PT, PESTLE, based
upon the background and expertise of the analyst, researcher, author. The lack of a standardized
method to address factors/forces for assessing and measuring national security priorities tends to
lessen the focus on how and which entity/institution should leverage which instrument of power
to shape the best-suited policy or strategy. Quite innovatively, the thesis applied MIDFIELD as a
taxonomy framework to address strategic analysis on Libya. This enabled organized isolation of
the implications on each MIDFIELD dimension, allowing for the derivation of areas of policy
intervention. The use of a commonly accepted lexicon across the national security enterprise,
academia, think-tanks, scholars would ease the identification of the strategic national security
priority and maximize/optimize debates and discussions on how to tackle the identified issues.
Second, future foreign policy debates and research should also assess the
inappropriateness of including North Africa in the MENA paradigm. It is worth considering
North African countries as part of a broader within-Africa discourse. The reasoning stems from
two considerations: first, as long as the Libya crisis will remain framed within a MENA context,
it will continue to be considered a side show to which devote the least national security attention,
not least as it is suspended between AFRICOM and CENTCOM areas of responsibility. Second,
if Libya were included in an African discourse, it would likely receive primary attention,
prompting a more Africa-centric policy discussion in Washington.
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Third, in the light of the identified patterns and potential paths, future research and
attention should be placed on Russia and China and the operationalization of their strategies in
Africa, exploring the US moves to counter their expansive reach. This pertains to the architecture
of the US intelligence community in Africa. How to maximize US IC assets and actionability to
the benefit of policymakers and national security? This inevitably questions the challenges vs.
opportunities to relocate AFRICOM in Africa. To date, AFRICOM is the only US military
geographic combatant command not based in its area of responsibility. Further analysis entails
the needed relocation of the US diplomatic mission in Libya. Much of the progressive,
uncontrolled, and unregulated growing interference was made possible by the physical absence
of US diplomats in the country, preventing the US from gaining first-hand assessment and
keeping the pulse of the instability. Accordingly, a field of future research is the checks and
balances assessment of remote warfare based on UAVs and kinetic surgical operations as an (unsustainable?) approach for conflicts resolutions like Libya (but also Syria and Yemen).
Fourth, among the most challenging argument for near-future research on Libya, it is
worth exploring how/if the UN failed its mission and if/how the US could assist with a more
effective and sustainable role. In the light of the hard-to-forecast results of the upcoming
elections in December, it is essential to address challenges and vulnerabilities and be prepared
with a more sustainable assistance/security architecture, proving effective leadership as a reliable
international interlocutor for conflicts and crises resolution. It calls for further research in the
area of Mediterranean security, addressing the options of EU and NATO-EU-based sustainable
plans for crisis management that might optimize US resources available in Europe.
Lastly, within the consideration above, the normative discussion offers research
arguments to investigate further and explore the operationalization of US policies and strategies
in Libya. Despite the audacious reach of the proposed options in the normative discussion, the
US cannot be exempt from renovating its engagement in Libya to reshape the current status
quo’s detrimental national security implications into favorable outcomes. This discourse cannot
neglect the fact that a US domestic political piece and the majority of the American people are
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likely against an overreaching reengagement in Libya and the conflict words type of narrative
and debate. Such awareness finds in the ‘Collige et Impera’ paradigm the sustainable approach
to reengagement.
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Glossary
AQ

Al-Qaeda

AQIM

Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb

CT

Counter-Terrorism

DoD

(United States) Department of Defence

DoS

(United States) Department of State

DoT

(United States) Department of Treasury

EU

European Union

FTO

Foreign Terrorist Organization

GWoT

Global War on Terror

GNA

(Libyan) Government of National Accord

GNC

(Libyan) General National Council

GNU

(Libyan) Government of National Unity

GPC

Great-Power Competition

HoR

(Libyan) House of Representatives

IC

(United States) Intelligence Community

INSSG

(United States) Interim National Security Strategy Guidance

IS

Islamic State

JMC

(Libyan) Joint Military Commission

LNA

Libyan National Army

LPDF

Libyan Political Dialogue Forum

MB

Muslim Brotherhood

MENA

Middle East and North Africa
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MIDFIELD

Military, Informational, Diplomacy, Financial, Intelligence, Economic, Law,
Development

NATO

North Atlantic Treaty Organization

TNC

(Libyan) Transitional National Council

UAE

United Arab Emirates

UAV

Unmanned Aerial Vehicle

UN

United Nations

UNSC

United Nations Security Council

UNSMIL

United Nations Support Mission in Libya

US

United States

USAID

United States Agency for International Development
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Appendix A. 2011-2021 MIDFIELD Matrix
Year

Libyan
Ruling
Entities

Instruments of
power

M - Military

I - Informational

D - Diplomatic

F - Financial
2011

TNC
I - Intelligence

E - Economic

L - Law

D - Development

Impactful events
The Ghaddafi-rebels established TNC imposed to
NATO/UN to limit military intervention to air
bombing campaigns.

Restored nationwide accessibility to internet
networks and devices remained unregulated and
easily exploitable for propaganda.
Appointment and change of two UN special
envoys (Abdelelah al-Khatib with Ian Martin) to
Libya within a year. Settlement of UNSMIL and
imposition of a permanent, international arms
embargo approved by the UNSC.
Alongside the arms embargo, UNSC enacted
freezing Ghadaffi-linked financial assets, bank
accounts, national and international investments.
Inadequate allocation and deployment of US IC
resources (personnel and budget) compared to
the post-Ghaddafi level of instability.

The focus of central bank efforts narrowed on
funding rebels/militias to pay wages.
In the aftermath of the uprisings against Ghaddafi,
the lack of a centralized judicial authority resulted
in the lack of rule law delegated to local
communities.

Lack of centralized control and management of
critical state infrastructures such as power plants,
water systems, and oil facilities. Critical
infrastructures management soon started to
suffer from in-house corruption.
US/NATO's overreliance on local militias to
enforce a security framework inhibited control
over militias affiliations.

M - Military

I - Informational

2012

TNC
GNC
D - Diplomatic

F - Financial

I - Intelligence

The internet and social media weaponization
empowered terrorist organizations (LMB, AQIM,
Ansar al-Sharia, IS) for propaganda.
Appointment of the third special envoy (Tarek
Mitri) to Libya within UNSMIL.
The killing of US Ambassador Stevens to Libya and
three security personnel in Benghazi in September
hampered DoS efforts in Libya and caused
reticence amidst the US administration to further
involve Libyan affairs.
Protracted liquidity crisis and sanctions to counter
the militias-managed market of migrant smuggling
further weakened the financial system.
The killing of US Ambassador Stevens exposed the
vulnerabilities of US IC covert presence and
operations in Libya.
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Effects
The ‘no foreign boots on the ground’ condition
channeled the execution of military operations to
rebels/local militias in the absence of on the
ground NATO/UN centralized command and
control.
Uncontrolled and unregulated access and use of
internet networks for rebels propaganda and
militias parochial narratives to fuel post-Ghaddafi
fragmentation of power.
Rebels/militias' need to arm their local groups
under the arms embargo prompted the
acquisition of illicit weapons from third-party
actors, either terrorists or state actors.
Inability to conduct any Libya-funded financial
sustainment to local communities heightens the
risk of alternative forms of financing (terrorists
and criminal organizations).
Compromise of US IC efforts (CIA-led) to train
rebel fighters, especially in eastern Libya, to win
Libyans' favor and thus achieve US competitive
advantage in the post-Ghaddafi reconstruction
process.
Spread of illicit forms of businesses among Libyan
communities to generate incomes to self-sustain.
Localized management of the law devolved to
tribal communities/militias increases the risk for
foreign personnel physical security and facilities
and holds potentials for the continuation of
violence/abuses on internally displaced
personnel.
Terrorists increased efforts in infiltrating amid
local militias channeling funds/services to local
communities so as to empower their preaching
and recruitment strategies.
Instances of deception of US and NATO support
for parochial interests proved this strategy
ineffective. Moreover, the growing presence and
grip of Salafi Islamist groups (Ansar al-Sharia), AQ,
and IS among local militias to target US personnel
and infrastructures made local militias unreliable
as security providers.
Powered terrorist recruitment and propaganda
anti-UN/US/NATO mobilized foreign fighters from
neighboring countries to gather in Libya
De-escalation of US diplomatic involvement in
Libya and lack of US leadership for UN/NATO
engagement strategies.

War economy empowers terrorism presence and
increases illicit revenues to finance the Jihad antiUS.
Reduced operability and maneuverability of
ground assets prompted terrorist infiltration
among Islamist rebels/militias.

E - Economic

L - Law

D - Development

M - Military

I - Informational

Increased corruption fueled the central bank
system’s insolvency risk due to unsustainable
salaries payment to politicians and security
providers.

Absence of the centralized rule of law and transfer
of power to GNC in July.

Increased risk of disruption of critical
infrastructures (power plants, roads, oil facilities,
water) for competing domestic interests (GNC vs.
non-Islamist militias) hit local communities'
capacity to develop business outside the control of
local armed groups.
The absence of a centralized Libyan security force
and decentralization of order and control to local
militias prompted the exponential increase of
militias/armed groups affiliates.
Sustained terrorist propaganda campaign across
the internet and social media by IS primarily.
GNC proved the inability to gain broad authority
consensus among non-Islamist factions.

D - Diplomatic

F - Financial

2013

GNC

I - Intelligence

E - Economic

L - Law

D - Development

M - Military

International sanctions issued to combat human
rights violations and migrant abuses primarily
burden local communities. They revealed ill
effectiveness in contrasting illicit activities such as
increasing human trafficking, weapons, and drugs
smuggling.
Decreased presence of US IC assistance programs,
primary sources of intelligence for UNSMIL, amidst
increased corruption/deception of local assets,
impacted the effectiveness of UN policies for crisis
management/resolution.
The expansion of the Libyan war economy based
on migrant trafficking, oil smuggling, drugs,
weapons contraband, and abuse of national
revenues to pay minimum wage salaries to local
communities empowered fragmentation.
The ‘lustration law’ enacted in May delegitimized
anyone who worked with Ghaddafi from holding
public offices or political roles/responsibilities
during the country's transition to a unified
government and constitution approval.
The growing armed competition for oil trade
control and oil revenues appropriation paralyzed
the financial and economic systems, thus
hindering the sustainability of healthcare,
education, and labor sustainability.
The first post-Ghadaffi civil war between HoR/LNA
(led by General Khalifa Haftar, who launched
‘Operation Dignity’) and pro-Islamist GNC was
aggravated by the surge in the number of militiasmembers.
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Legal ways and means of the economy were
vulnerable to extortion, blackmail, and bribery,
and local communities turned to alternative war
economy types of sustainment to guarantee
sources of income. It benefitted criminal activities
and terrorists.
Insufficient security for international personnel
and facilities due to the unreliability of local
forms of law control discouraged UNSMIL from
powering its assistance commitment.
Growing exposure to failure of development/
reconstruction UN-funded projects, high risk of
bribery and extortion in exchange for protection.

Deployment of US/NATO assets limited to special
forces and UAVs to support anti-AQ and IS
operations made it impossible to counter the
growing number of militants affiliated with
militias.
The exploitation of internet means as tools for
widespread propaganda weakened the UNSMIL
narrative of unity among Libyans.
US foreign policy indecisiveness following the
death of Ambassador Stevens resulted in DoS
assets and capabilities’ ineffectiveness in backing
UN efforts to achieve a power-sharing agreement
to avoid clashes erupting between the different
power centers that had previously worked
together to topple the Gaddafi regime.
The financial paralysis triggered local
communities' affiliation with terrorists and
criminals for self-sustainment.

Maintained covert interference of third-party
actors destabilized any UN policy or strategy for
conflict resolution, empowering LNA in the East
and prompting a collaboration between coastal
militias, local criminal gangs, and terrorists for
illicit human and weapons smuggling.
Severe risk of bribery, blackmail, extortion, and
illicit taxation of local businesses by militias and
local criminal gangs in exchange for protection
discouraged foreign investment/assistance/aid.
Failure to take action in May 2013 to refuse to
recognize the lustration law that allowed
Islamists to consolidate their power by wiping out
non-Islamist opponents will likely result in future
political-animated clashes.
Terrorists and criminal organizations exploited
the development/provision of essential services
stalemate and economic bankruptcy to expand
their reachability in the country and infiltrate
affiliates in key sectors.
Lowered likelihood to achieve a centralized
Libyan security force.

I - Informational

2014

HoR
GNC

D - Diplomatic

Sustained weaponization of social media by IS
terrorists and affiliates attracted foreign fighters
from neighboring African countries to sustain the
interests of terrorists in Syria and Iraq.
Appointment of the fourth UN special envoy to
Libya (Bernardino Leon).
The evacuation of US diplomatic personnel from
Tripoli to Tunisia due to the increased insecurity
and grown intensity of civil war-related clashes
between HoR and GNC left a diplomatic void
detrimental for UNSMIL.

E - Economic

Labour unrest and scarce access to state funds
amidst the corruption of financial system officials
prolonged the burden on local communities.
Underfinanced and under-resourced US IC
capacities are unable to provide decisionadvantage for US and UN policies.
War economy leading to central bank system
bankruptcy.

L - Law

The GNC-HoR political and military clashes caused
nationwide protests by armed tribe members over
the central power management and oil resource.

F - Financial

I - Intelligence

D - Development

M - Military

Disruption/threat of disruption of critical
infrastructure, oil, electricity, and water facilities
by militias
The IS strategy to co-opt, coerce, and expand in
Libya intensified in violence.
Powered IS propaganda campaign on social media.

I - Informational

D - Diplomatic

2015

HoR
GNC

F - Financial

I - Intelligence

E - Economic

L - Law

D - Development

M - Military

The UN successfully brokered the LPA, or Skhirat
agreement, between HoR and GNC to achieve
consensus on the GNA.
Amidst the LPA milestone, the replacement of the
UN special envoy is noteworthy due to allegations
of corruption. Hence, the appointment of the fifth
UN special envoy to Libya (Martin Kobler).
The persistence of international sanctions and
freeze of national assets tied to the former
Ghaddafi regime hampered the financial
sustainability of existing assets.
Settlement of Salafist-led training camps in South
Fezzan and Cyrenaica, creating drugs and weapons
trafficking routes controlled by AQIM and Ansar
al-Sharia.
Oil revenues diverted from national investments
to pay for security.
Transitional government towards the election of
GNA in December amidst the corruption of Libyan
officials.
Unsustainable educational, healthcare, labor
projects undermined the welfare of local
communities, increasingly prey to terrorists and
militias
Sustained US aerial campaign via UAVs in support
of GNA to free Sirte from IS. In the aftermath, end
of its military campaign against IS targets in Libya.
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Sustained terrorists' propaganda weakened any
UN-vouched (and US-backed) pro-unification
narrative.
Ill-effective UN brokering effort for peace and US
absence led to ill-coordinated EU diplomatic
attempts (EUNAVFOR mission in partnership with
Libyan coast guard) in contrast to migrant
trafficking across the Mediterranean routes.
The civil war meant that the role of UNSMIL
changed from helping with the transition to
democracy and state-building to a role focused
on peacemaking and conflict resolution.
Increased affiliation with criminal gangs to
benefit from illicit finances and black-market illicit
traffics (drugs and weapons smuggling)
The infiltration of terrorists in the country
reinforced propaganda and recruitment
campaigns amidst LNA-GNC clashes.
Among war economy dynamics, increase of illicit
taxation to local communities for security amidst
clashes for power between GNC militias and LNA.
The consequent severe risk for US personnel
security (armed robbery, kidnapping, ransommotivated attacks) and disruption of US facilities
in the country persuaded the US administration
to evacuation its diplomatic mission to Libya.
Decrease in available licit fundings from the oil
market to support assistance and aid programs.
The US funneled military effort on CT operations
providing special forces and UAVs assistance and
support.
Reinvigorated terrorist propaganda decreased
consensus in reunification efforts among Libyans
while increasing radicalization.
GNA's expectations to regain security control of
the country and weaken third parties' influence
were jeopardized by endemic corruption among
institutions and country officials.

Financial CT strategies further undermine the
Libyan capacity to boost the national economy
and regenerate financial activities.
The inability to prevent the expansion of terrorist
hubs in Libya heightened the terrorism threat
alert in the EU and destabilized US foreign in
Africa and ME.
Economic security issues will further aggravate
the war economy dynamics in favor of terrorists
and illicit lines of credit.
Decentralized territorial control facilitated the
terrorist expansion in Libya and illicit
appropriation of EU and UN funds for
development and assistance.
US adversaries, state and non-state actors, are
likely to exploit the loss of trust in UN/US aid
among local communities for anti-US
disinformation.
The US intervention triggered the increased influx
of terrorists and jihadists in Libya, who exploited

I - Informational

D - Diplomatic
2016

GNA
HoR
F - Financial

I - Intelligence

E - Economic

L - Law

D - Development

M - Military

I - Informational

D - Diplomatic

F - Financial
2017

GNA
HoR
I - Intelligence

E - Economic

L - Law

D - Development

M - Military

LNA intensified propaganda campaigns over the
internet and use of social media to instrumental
narrative to destabilize GNA.
HoR (Haftar) did not recognize GNA authority
despite international acknowledgment of
government of unity.
Immission in the bank system of unauthorized
Libyan currency from Russia to sustain Haftar LNA
personnel and operations boosted clashes
between GNA and LNA.
Porous borders with neighboring countries and
the existence of well-established and lucrative
smuggling routes to sub-Saharan Africa
exponentially hindered the ability of intelligence
to maintain accountability of terrorists in the
country.
Sanctions further penalized the central bank
system that accepted the illicit immission of
Russian-printed Libyan currency in the economy.
Weak GNA leadership could not oppose fake
currency immission by Russian.
Power shortages, crumbling health care facilities,
and banking crises undermine social stability.

Increased LNA military operations against IS and
Islamists destabilized the positions of international
GNA backers, ambiguously inclined to let LNA
proceed in the fight.
Decrease internet use for terrorist propaganda but
outbreaks of Russian influence operations to
undermine the political unity discourse.
Appointment of the sixth UN special envoy to
Libya (Ghassan Salame).
Substantial US diplomatic retreat of the Trump
administration in support of UN peacekeeping
operations negatively impacted the reconciliation
of GNA and Haftar.
Underfinanced EUTF and reduction of US budget
for foreign assistance in Africa amidst the
corruption of Libyan officials penalized the ability
to support local communities.
Budget cut of the US administration to US IC and
DoS assistance programs in Africa penalized
resources to devote to Libya.
Underfinanced projects for reconstruction and
businesses paralyzed the economic system, thus
unable to support local populations.
The unsustainable absence of a centralized rule of
law forced territorial forms of law control devoted
to local militias.
Rival forces continuos clashes for the control of
energy and oil infrastructures contributed to the
decrease of oil production (hence oil revenues),
resulting in the lack of funding to devote to the
sustainment of local healthcare, energy services.
The prolonged low-tempo, large-scale clashes
between GNA and LNA exasperated the
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border porosity in the South to sustain the fight
against the US.
Inefficacy of UN/US unification narrative.

Under-the-radar agreements/relations between
foreign state actors and Libyan factions of
preference undermined collective diplomatic
effort in support of unity.
Disruption of the financial regulatory system will
render Libya a safe haven for money laundering
for criminal organizations and terrorists.
Eased IS and AQIM control and potential use of
smuggling routes to contraband oil, drugs,
weapons, and illegal goods.

Such a decision sanctioned the Russian gained
power and influence in Libya, proving a USdetrimental economic dependency of Eastern
Libya, hence LNA/HoR, on Russia.
Increased Russian influence and power in Eastern
Libya will further undermine the effectiveness of
LPA and the reunification process.
The rulers will hardly counter the increment of
unauthorized detrimental initiatives prompted by
external actors for a unified development
strategy.
LNA military campaign triggered insecurity
concerns in neighboring countries and within
Libya due to terrorists on the run.
US adversaries exploit the inflection of terrorist
narratives to spread anti-UN (US)
democratization discourse.
The reduced US diplomatic involvement in Libya
opened to third parties and external
interferences to foreign actors' Divide et Impera
strategies.

Alternative forms of financing from illicit
businesses remained valid options of income,
disincentivizing legality.
Reduction of US intelligence capacities to
maintain reliable and current oversight on the
Libyan crisis prompted deception from local
assets and partnered agencies operating in Libya.
Expansion of criminal/terrorist infiltrations in
local economies.
Lack of oversight in the law control and
management prompted human rights violations
and abuses on political rivals, migrants, and the
labor force.
Disruption of NOC authority will lead to
decentralization of oil production to benefit
factional interests, exposing to third-parties
control of oil revenues.
GNA resources diverted from the counter-IS fight
to the battle with Haftar.

I - Informational

D - Diplomatic

2018

GNA
HoR

F - Financial

I - Intelligence

E - Economic

L - Law

D - Development

M - Military

I - Informational

D - Diplomatic

F - Financial

2019

GNA
HoR
I - Intelligence

E - Economic

L - Law

D - Development

M - Military
I - Informational

emplacement of any UNSMIL advanced security
framework.
Low-paced but prolonged propaganda campaigns
spreading LNA narrative and anti-unification
efforts by LNA foreign backers.
EU-vouched dialogues between GNA and Haftar
amidst external state-actors polarization proved
disunity of effort and lack of coordination in
advancing a UN/EU/MENA shared diplomatic
initiative for stability.
Budget constraints for any financial assistance
program.
Increasing corruption of Libyan officials involved in
illicit businesses further limited reliable
assessments on the policy options for crisis
resolution.
Lack of sustainable bank system exposed to
external pressure and interests related to the
exploitation of Libyan oil revenues.
GNA and Haftar disagreed on national elections
and constitution approval, which did not occur as
scheduled in December.
The unauthorized splitting of the National Oil
Corporation (NOC) into Eastern NOC in the
Cyrenaica under the control of Haftar jeopardized
collective investments.
Decisive LNA military operations to occupy Tripoli
and take power by territorial expansionism in the
form of an anti-Islamic-terrorist campaign.
Russia enabled the ideological propaganda
campaign of LNA to win tribe members' support in
the Fezzan and Tripolitania region during the
Haftar campaign.
Ambiguous verbal support of President Trump in
favor of Haftar operations to free the Tripolitania
region from Islamists.
Provision of financial incentives by Haftar (backed
by Russia, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and UAE) to buy
consensus among local tribes during the LNA
advance to Tripoli.
Increased presence of Russian mercenaries to
assist LNA military training raised concerns for
counter-intelligence efforts on US/NATO
equipment and assets.
Amidst the endemic corruption of bank system
officials, GNA funding appeared sustainable, while
LNA funding was mainly based on a predatory
economy.
The rule of law remains managed by local militias.
Armed groups on all sides continued to kill
unlawfully and shell indiscriminately, killing
civilians and destroying vital infrastructure.
The conflict hampered the provision of basic
services, including health and electricity, fueling
migration and displacement.
Continuation of LNA operations amidst the
pandemic spread until August, when GNA
achieved an agreement on a ceasefire by LNA.
LNA sustained social media presence, whereas
western militias are less cohesive in their online
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Backed by China and Iran, Russia will likely
expand anti-UN/US propaganda to delegitimize
reunification.
Third-party conflicting interferences jeopardize
UN capacity to achieve sustainable paths for
effective political dialogue.

Boost for criminal and terrorist illicit forms of
financing local communities and militants.
Endemic corruption among political and
institutional apparatus undermined Libyan's
capacity to achieve sustainable stability favorable
to US dominance in the country, with drawbacks
in the broader MENA.
Increased bilateral agreements with external
state actors will reduce the ability of Libya to
recover its economy relying on external credit.
A prolonged law vacuum boosted criminality and
terrorism while aggravating the humanitarian
crisis of migrants and displaced personnel.
The central bank was deprived of shares of the oil
revenues for sustainable development programs.

Russia deployed jets, UAVs, and mercenaries in
support of the LNA military campaign.
Substantial anti-UN/US misinformation and
disinformation campaigns ill-impacted the US
role, power, influence in the country.
US ambiguity will undermine Libyan-Libyan
dialogue and prompt increased external
interferences to fragment the political instability
further.
Disruption of any licit financial framework and
advancement of alternative financial support
from US competitors in the MENA implied
progressive loss of financial influence in the
region.
Expansion of Russian influence and power to
leverage anti-US interests in the broader MENA
also posed security risks on NATO's southern
flank.
The disproportion of economic assets of GNA and
LNA exasperated the rivalry between the oil
ministry and the NOC in competition for the
control and management of the oil and gas
sector.
The criminal justice system remained
dysfunctional due to impunity, insecurity, and
armed conflicts.
The increased number of internally displaced
personnel and migrants aggravated the
humanitarian crisis of migrants fleeing across the
Mediterranean routes towards the EU.
The fights displaced nearly 28,000 people in
western and central Libya, aggravating migrant
crisis management.
Russia has been vital for helping the LNA improve
its brand and to disparage its opponents. Russian

D - Diplomatic

2020

GNA
HoR
F - Financial

I - Intelligence

E - Economic

L - Law

activity. Disinformation and misinformation
regarding the Covid-19 pandemic by Russia and
China.
The resignation of the sixth UN special envoy was
filled ad-interim by Stephanie Williams.
The LPDF outcomes agreed on a nationwide
ceasefire, expelling foreign fighters, suspension of
third-party military training programs.

The shutdown/blockade of oil terminals and sales
led to a national budget collapse.
Russian mercenaries and Chinese military advisers
in Libya amidst UN requests to zero foreign
presence erode US/NATO competitive advantage
in the country and the MENA.

Contraction of the economy by 12% due to Covid19 imposed budget cut to local communities.
The absence of a centralized authority to manage
the rule of law enabled continued human rights
violations.
LNA's blockade of oil terminals amidst the
increasing spread of the Covid-19 pandemic.

D - Development

Year

Libyan
Ruling
Entities

Instruments of
power
M - Military

I - Informational

D - Diplomatic

F - Financial
2021

GNA
HoR
GNU
I - Intelligence

E - Economic

L - Law

D - Development

actors have sponsored and disseminated online
news media and Facebook on several occasions,
including anti-US propaganda.
Amidst LPDF talks, the marginal role of the US in
the dialogue process weakened its ability to
leverage influence in the resolution strategy, also
increasingly compromised by Turkey seeking to
expand its trans-Mediterranean power to counter
the Russian axis (in turn, reinforced by China and
Iran in the background).
The decrease in national revenues from the oil
market halted any ongoing financed projects and
risked fueling social unrest nationwide.
China backing Russia's sympathy for Haftar and
Turkey advancing its strategic security coadministrator role aside GNA to expand its own
security, diplomatic, and commercial power in
the Mediterranean exasperated GPC dynamics to
the detriment of US role in the MENA.
Libyan institutions are prone to receive any form
of economic relief from the economic crisis.
The inability to guarantee security and the
dysfunctional judicial system aggravated the
humanitarian crisis of migrants fleeing to the EU
and migrant workers' condition within Libya.
The collapse of the weak healthcare system,
amidst the pandemic, due to lack of financial
resources to treat Libyans and buy the vaccine
attracted US-adversaries, China primarily,
incentivizing foreign vaccine diplomacy initiatives.

Impactful events
The agreement on a ceasefire between LNA and GNA and the agreed termination of foreign military
interference in Libya allowed GNU establishment, with the promise to peacefully transition towards
scheduled democratic elections in December.
Amidst Russian and China vaccine disinformation, the UN vouched for a cross-sponsored endorsement
for GNU across Libya's media and news platforms.
GNU Prime Minister Dbeibah has been aided by an unprecedented effort of the US and UN to boost proGNU propaganda across social media at home and abroad.
Amidst the seventh UN special envoy to Libya (Jan Kubis) appointment, LPDF formally convened in
January and successfully led to GNU settlement in March as per agreement between GNA and HoR to
transition elections in December and issuance of a new constitution.
The US technical support is well underway with programs to assist Libya’s High National Elections
Commission.
GNU committed to providing state funding from Libya’s oil wealth to both GNA and HoR factions in an
attempt/effort to mitigate the conflict for oil production sites control and fairly balance the access,
allocation, and attribution of oil revenues. The US co-chairs an international working group to unite
Libya’s financial institution after years of separation.
Vaccine diplomacy efforts by China and Russia and the increased presence of military consultants for
security force assistance/training of Libyan militias undermine the under-resourced capacities of the US
IC to maintain decision and competitive advantage in Libya favorable to broader MENA policies and
strategies.
Following a massive economic contraction in 2020, Libya’s oil and gas sector, and in turn its economy
overall, is witnessing a significant rebound. According to the World Bank data, if presidential and
parliamentary elections succeed, stability could project Libya to a forecasted GDP growth rate of over 70
percent in 2021.
The criminal justice system and law enforcement authorities remain only partially functional. Civilian
and military courts operate at reduced capacity amidst armed groups who continue to intimidate,
harass, threaten, physically attack, and arbitrarily detain journalists, political activists, migrants, and
displaced personnel enacting restrictive laws that undermine freedom of speech.
Amidst the severe negative impact on social-service delivery systems of the protracted conflict and the
COVID-19 pandemic, the UN endeavored to strengthen the education and healthcare systems and grant
access to quality basic services for all people in Libya across health, protection service, food, and
nutrition sectors.
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Appendix B. International Interests of Main State Actors

Roles and interests of main foreign state actors in the pre-GNU Libya (Megerisi, 2020)
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